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Abstract
Intrusion detection is an important task for network operators in today’s Internet.
Traditional network intrusion detection systems rely on either specialized signatures
of previously seen attacks, or on labeled traffic datasets that are expensive and
difficult to reproduce for user-profiling to hunt out network attacks. Machine learning
methods could be used in this area since they could get knowledge from signatures
or as normal-operation profiles. However, there is usually a large volume of data in
intrusion detection systems, for both features and instances.
Feature selection can be used to optimize the classifiers used to identify attacks by
removing redundant or irrelevant features while improving the quality. In this thesis,
six feature selection algorithms are developed, and their application to intrusion
detection is evaluated.
They are: Cascading Fuzzy C Means Clustering and C4.5 Decision Tree Classifica-
tion Algorithm, New Evidence Accumulation Ensemble with Hierarchical Clustering
Algorithm, Modified Mutual Information-based Feature Selection Algorithm, Mutual
Information-based Feature Grouping Algorithm, Feature Grouping by Agglomer-
ative Hierarchical Clustering Algorithm, and Online Streaming Feature Selection
Algorithm.
All algorithms are evaluated on the KDD 99 dataset, the most widely used data
set for the evaluation of anomaly detection methods, and are compared with other
algorithms. The potential application of these algorithms beyond intrusion detection
is also examined and discussed.
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W Ith the development of computer technology and network communicationtechnology, computer network spread rapidly in recent years. Internet has
become an important medium for information exchange and sharing in our society.
Internet has huge information capacity, high speed transmission, worldwide coverage,
a high degree of openness and interactivity. So it is profoundly changing the way
of people’s work and live, and influences political, economic, military, cultural and
technological development[126].
Network information security has become more and more serious as the rapid
development of the computer network. And it is also an important factor restricting
the development of the network. In recent years, network attacks and information
security incidents occured frequently, covering areas more and more widely, and
increasingly harmful[164]. In october of 2002, the top 13 root domain name server
which are responsible for global Internet working are attacked by DDoS(Distributed
Denial of Service). And it results in nine servers were interrupted their service[157].
In January 2003, Internet suffered massive "worm" virus. Global network services
were severely affected, including the Americas, Europe, Asia, Australia[26]. From
2011, other new challenges appeared, such as data unauthorized disclosure, cell
phone privacy and security problems, Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) attacks
and so on. Network security issues have caused economic losses to some companies.
And users will panic and dare not trust the network[130, 5]. Network security is a
process of defence all forms of threats from internal and external in order to ensure
security of communications network and information [60]. And network security
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design usually include safety equipment, firewall, vitual private network, intrusion
detection system, security server and access control mechanism. According to system
security, research on network security is divided into attack and defense. Attack
techniques include computer network scanning, monitoring, stealth, invasion and
backdoor. Defense technology mainly includes security configuration of operating
system, firewall technology, information encryption technology and network intrusion
detection[156].
1.1 Network Security Threat
Network security covers secure storage, transport and application of information in
network[16]. The concept of network security mainly includes the following basic
elements which is shown in figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Basic elements of network security
Confidentiality means that information is not leaked to unauthorized entities.
And unauthorized entities could not access and understand the information. Integrity
is concerned with prevent information from unauthorized tampering or destruction
in order to ensure that the system the information provided is complete and correct.
Authentication verifies the authenticity of the identity declared at the identification
stage. Non-repudiation refers to prove that the message was sent or receive by
2
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using cryptographic digital signatures[171]. Besides the four elements in figure 1.1,
availability, controllability and accountability are also elements of network security.
At present, there are many threats in network and they are mainly in following
aspects.
1. Unauthorized access. Access to the network or computer information resources
without pre-authorized.
2. Destroy the integrity of information. Delete, modify or add some important
information to interfere with the normal use of the information in the system,
or to obtain a response which is attackers desired .
3. Information leakage or loss. Information is lost or stolen in transit, information
loss or leakage in a storage medium, the encrypted information is decrypted
and so on.
4. Interfere with the normal operation of the system. Constantly on the network
service system interference, to change its normal operating state, make the
system response slow down or even stop, affecting the normal users.
Currently, computer viruses and network intrusion attacks are the two most
common implementation of network threats. Network attacks are always in a large
number of network activities and not susceptible to geographical and time limits.
Network attacks can be classified from different ways[147]. According to the
location and manner of attacks, network attacks can be divided into remote attacks,
local attacks and pseudo remote attacks. In accordance with the purpose and general
characteristics of attacks, the current network attacks can be classified to denial of
service attack, information collection attacks and so on. The computer system attack
classification based on the known attack classification analysis and personal knowl-
edge was composed by N. Paulauskas and E. Garsva in 2006[146]. The suggested
computer system attack classification is shown in figure 1.2. Every attack possesses
all 14 listed features.
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Figure 1.2: Suggested computer system attack classification
1.2 Intrusion Detection System and Feature
Selection
1.2.1 Intrusion Detection System
As it is described above, intrusion detection system (IDS) is a part of network security
design. An intrusion detection system monitors network traffic for suspicious activity
and alerts the system or network administrator in order to take evasive action. It has
a very important position in the network information security and it is considered as
the second security gate after firewall. In recent years, intrusion detection method
and key technology has become one of research focus in network security field.
IDS could be classified in different ways[24]. There are network based (NIDS)
4
1.2. Intrusion Detection System and Feature Selection
and host based (HIDS) intrusion detection systems[185]. There are misuse-based
intrusion detection and anomaly-based intrusion detection. It will described in detail
in chapter 2.
Network Intrusion Detection Systems are placed at a strategic point or points
within the network to monitor traffic to and from all devices on the network. A large
NIDS server can be set up on a backbone network, to monitor all traffic, or smaller
systems can be set up to monitor traffic for particular server, switch, gateway, or router.
It can be shown in figure 1.3. IDS could be placed in (Local Area Network)LAN,
(DeMilitarized Zone)DMZ or Internet area. Our research work is based on NIDS
since the data we used is collected by a kind of NIDS.
Figure 1.3: Computer network with intrusion detection systems
Traditional IDS is signature-based. It monitors packets on the network and
compare them against a database of signatures or attributes from known malicious
threats. And it could be seen as a classic kind of misuse-based IDS. The architecture
of signature-based IDS is shown in figure 1.4. It has low false positives but could not
5
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identify previously unknown attacks. The test dataset we used has unknown attacks
and they will be introduced in detail in chapter 2.
Figure 1.4: Signature-based IDS architecture
1.2.2 Feature Selection
Intrusion detection is a classification task, and it consists of building a predictive
model which can identify attack instances. On the one hand, there are too many
features or attributes which may contain false correlation, classification of anomaly
intrusion detection systems is complex work. Moreover, many features may be
irrelevant or redundant. For this reason, feature selection methods can be used to
get rid of the irrelevant and redundant features without decreasing performance[52,
102, 12].
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On the other hand, IDS usually runs day by day in real world. And the instance
in IDS datasets are very huge and they take time to do classification or clustering. It
will takes several days to get classification results from a dataset which has over 1
million instances. And if a dataset has a large number of instances and features, it
will take large memory and computation resources to run. Thus, feature selection is
very necessary to IDS datasets since they usually include a large number of instance
and features.
1.2.3 Aims of the thesis
This thesis focuses on feature selection algorithms for intrusion detection system.
And we test our algorithms by using some supervised methods, such as classification.
Feature selection with classification method structure diagram is described in figure
1.5. Some clustering algorithms for IDS are presented as well since they can be seen
as unsupervised methods. An algorithm to combine supervised and unsupervised
methods is also introduced in this thesis. To test our algorithms work well or not,
we choose a widely used dataset-KDD 99. Whether it will be introduced specifically
in section 1.3.
Figure 1.5: Framework of IDS based on feature selection
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The motivation of the thesis is to find the relationship between features and class
labels in a IDS dataset and design feature selection algorithms. Then, we select
features from IDS datasets by using these feature selection algorithms. Moreover, we
analysis the performance of selected features and compare with some other feature
selection algorithms. At last, we test proposed algorithms on other datasets to see
their effctiveness.
Besides dimensionality reduction and saving computation time, another advan-
tage of feature selection is get rid of irrelevant and redundant features from datasets.
A IDS dataset is usually got from network connections. Thus, it usually has many
features and some of them are useless or counterproductive for classification. And
these features can be seen as irrelevant and redundant. One of the purpose of feature
selection is remove this kind of features.
1.3 KDD 99 dataset
Since 1999, SIGKDD (Special Interest Group on Knowledge Discovery and Data
Mining) of ACM (Association for Computing Machinery) has been organizing an
annual KDD (Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery) CUP competition. Later on,
KDD 99 became the most popular dataset used for evaluation of anomaly detection
methods. This dataset consists of the data generated from DARPA’98 IDS evaluation
program, which comprises about 4 gigabytes of compressed raw (binary) tcpdump
data of 7 week network traffic, and can be processed into around 5 million connection
records with 100 bytes each. The test data of two weeks includes around 2 million
connection records[100].
The definition of a connection is a TCP data packet sequence including data from
source IP address to destination IP address in a predefined protocol (such as TCP or
UDP) from beginning to end in a period of time. Each connection is classified as either
attack or normal. An attack can be sub classified into four categories of 39 types.
The 7 week training dataset only contains 22 types of attacks, and the test dataset
includes other unknown 17 types[18]. It is notable that the probability distribution
of the test data is not the same as the one of training data, and also that the test data
contains certain attack types which do not appear in the training data. It is believed
by some intrusion experts that most of the novel attacks are variants of known attacks,
the signature of which is sufficient to capture novel variants[105, 153].
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1.3.1 Dataset Description
The training dataset is composed by about 4,900,000 single connection vectors. Each
of those vectors includes 41 features and one class label[80]. An attack can be
classified into one of the four categories as below:
(1) Denial of Service Attack (DoS): Some computing or memory resources are
made too busy or too full to accept legitimate requests, or to allow legitimate users
to access a machine. E.g., ping-of-death, syn flood, smurf.
(2) User to Root Attack (U2R): An attacker gains access to a normal user account
(perhaps by a dictionary attack, sniffing passwords or social engineering) and exploit
the vulnerability in the system to gain root access to it. E.g., guessing passwords.
(3) Remote to Local Attack (R2L): By sending packets to a machine over a network,
an illegitimate user exploits vulnerability of the machine to gain local access to it as
a user. E.g., buffer overflow attacks.
(4) Probing Attack: In order to circumventing the security controls of a computer
network, the attacker attempts to gather information of the network. E.g., port-scan,
ping-sweep.
KDD 99 features are divided into four categories:
(1) Basic features: This category contains all the attributes extracted from a
TCP/IP connection. The monitoring of these features will cause a fixed delay in
detection.
(2) Content features: The features of suspicious behavior in the data portion
should be captured in order to detect attacks. E.g. number of failed login attempts.
Those features are called content features. The R2L and U2R attacks normally don’t
appear in intrusion frequent sequential patterns, as they have been embedded in
the data portions of packets and only request a single connection. While the DoS
and Probing attacks involve many connections to hosts and show the attribute of
intrusion frequent sequential patterns.
(3) Time-based traffic features: Only the connections in the past 2 seconds are
examined, which have the same destination host/service as the current connection,
and of which the statistics related to protocol behavior, service, etc. are calculated.
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(4) Connection-based traffic features: Some slow probing attacks scan the
hosts/service at an internal much longer than 2 seconds, e.g. once in every minute,
which cannot be detected by the time-based traffic features, as it only examines the
connections in the past 2 seconds. In such case, the features of same destination
host/service connections can be re-calculated at an interval of every 100 connections
rather than a time window[50]
1.3.2 Statistical Observations
There are three components in KDD dataset, "10 % training KDD" dataset, "corrected
KDD" dataset and "whole KDD" dataset. The "10 % training KDD" dataset is used for
training purpose. There are 22 types of attacks in the training dataset. It is a more
concise version of the "whole KDD" dataset, and with the attack types representing
unequally, it includes more attack connections than normal. Also denial of service
attacks account for the majority of the dataset[28]. The basic characteristics of KDD
99 training dataset are represented in figure 1.6 and 1.7.
Figure 1.6: Basic characteristics of "10%
KDD" training dataset
Figure 1.7: Basic characteristics of "whole
KDD" training dataset
The "Corrected KDD" dataset is a test dataset with different statistical distributions
from either "10% training KDD" or "Whole KDD". It contains 17 additional attacks[92].
The basic characteristics of "corrected KDD" dataset is shown in figure 1.8.
The list of class labels and their corresponding categories for "10% training KDD"
and "Corrected KDD" dataset are described in table 1.1.
There are several categories of derived features. Basic features of individual TCP
connections are shown in table 1.2. Content features are illustrated in table 1.3.
Time-based traffic features only examine the connections in the past two seconds,
10
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Figure 1.8: Basic characteristics of "corrected KDD" dataset
which have the same destination host/service as the current connection, and for
which the statistics related to protocol behavior, service, etc are calculated. The
"same host" and "same service" features are together called time-based traffic features,
which are illustrated in table 1.4[167].
There are probing attacks which scan the hosts/ports at a much longer inter-
nal than two seconds, e.g. once in every minute. Such connections are not able
to be detected by time-based traffic features. Therefore, connection-based traffic
features[181] are introduced to examine the connection records at a window of 100
connections for the connections to the same host/service. It is shown in table 1.5.
1.4 Structure of Thesis
This section outlines the structure of the remainder of this thesis. Figure 1.9 illustrates
the relationships between the individual chapters (other than the introduction). The
direct dependencies between the chapters are denoted using solid arrows, where
conceptual linkages are symbolised using dashed lines. The contributions of this
thesis are mainly shown in chapter 3 to chapter 6 and we design and implement six
algorithms. Four of the proposed algorithms are feature selection algorithms and
they could help for classification. Another two algorithms could help for clustering
and conbine with feature selection.
11
1. INTRODUCTION
Figure 1.9: Relationships between thesis chapters
Chapter 2: Background
This chapter provides a background introduction to intrusion detection system and
feature selection. This chapter also provides a comprehensive review of the most
recent methods for feature selection.
Chapter 3: Modified Mutual Information-based Feature Selection
for Intrusion Detection Systems in Decision Tree Learning
Mutual information-based feature selection method was first proposed by Battiti
in 1994. It was modified by Huawen Liu in 2009 and by Fatemeh in 2011. This
chapter proposes a modified mutual information feature selection method based on
Battiti’s work and compares the resulting performance with Huawen’s work. After
we calculate the selected features, we use the decision tree classification methods to
evaluate the performance.
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Chapter 4: Feature Grouping for Intrusion Detection based on
Mutual Information
This chapter presents two feature grouping methods for the selection of features for
intrusion detection. One method is based on mutual information theory and is tested
against KDD CUP 99 dataset. It ranks the mutual information between features
and uses the fuzzy C means algorithm to compose groups. Another one is based
on agglomerative hierarchical clustering method and is tested against KDD CUP 99
dataset as well. Agglomerative hierarchical clustering method is used to construct
a hierarchical tree and it is combined with mutual information theory. Groups are
created from the hierarchical tree by a given number.
Both of these two algorithms use the same selecting strategy of feature grouping.
The largest mutual information between each feature and a class label within a
certain group is then selected. The performance evaluation results show that better
classification performance can be attained from such selected features.
Chapter 5: Online Streaming Feature Selection for IDS
Unlike the existing studies on feature selection, online feature selection aims to solve
the feature selection problem by online learning approach. Streaming features are
features in dataset which flow one by one over time without changing the number of
training samples. In this chapter, I introduced two online feature selection algorithms.
One analyses relevance and redundancy between features and labels or features.
And users need to input two thresholds to help the algorithm judging. Another
algorithm design a criterion by relevance and redundancy between features and
labels or features. And users need to input a desired number of features will be
selected. From the comparison with other feature selection algorithms we proposed
before, we could see that OSFS algorithms could get better performance.
Chapter 6: Unsupervised Network Intrusion Detection System
This chapters introduces two algorithms. One is cascading Fuzzy C Means Clustering
and C4.5 Decision Tree Classification Algorithm. This method for classification is
proposed consisting of a combination of feature selection, normalization, fuzzy C
means clustering algorithm and C4.5 decision tree algorithm. The aim of this method
is to improve the performance of the classifier by using selected features. The fuzzy C
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means clustering method is used to partition the training instances into clusters. On
each cluster, we build a decision tree using C4.5 algorithm. Experiments on the KDD
CUP 99 data set shows that our proposed method in detecting intrusion achieves
better performance while reducing the relevant features by more than 80%.
Another one is new evidence accumulation clustering with hierarchical clustering
algorithm. It deals with features of the dataset one by one. In other words, it
clusters a feature one by one rather than clustering all features at the same time.
The algorithm uses voting mechanism to compose a co-association matrix and uses
hierarchical clustering algorithm with single link to get the final partition.
Chapter 7: Application to Other Datasets
This chapter will test all algorithms proposed in chapter 3, 4, 5, 6 on other datasets
and other areas, and compare performances with other methods or algorithms.
Chapter 8: Conclusion
This chapter summarises the key contributions made by the thesis, together with
a discussion of topics which form the basis for future research. Both immediately
achievable tasks and long-term projects are considered.
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Table 1.1: Class labels details that appears in "10% training KDD" and "Corrected
KDD" dataset
Category
Training Data Test Data
Class labels(23) Number Class labels(38) Number
Normal normal 97278 normal 60593
Probe
ipsweep 1247 ipsweep 306
nmap 231 nmap 84
portsweep 1040 portsweep 354




back 2203 back 1098
land 21 land 9
neptune 107201 neptune 58001
pod 264 pod 87
smurf 280790 smurf 164091






perl 3 perl 2
rootkit 10 rootkit 13
loadmodule 9 loadmodule 2






ftp-write 8 ftp-write 3
guess_passwd 53 guess_passwd 4367
multihop 7 multihop 18
phf 4 phf 2
imap 12 imap 1
spy 2 spy
warezclient 1020 warezclient











Table 1.2: Basic features of individual TCP connections
feature name description type
duration length (number of seconds) of the connection continuous
protocol_type type of the protocol, e.g. tcp, udp, etc. discrete
service network service on the destination, e.g., http,
telnet, etc.
discrete
src_bytes number of data bytes from source to destina-
tion
continuous
dst_bytes number of data bytes from destination to
source
continuous
flag normal or error status of the connection discrete
land 1 if connection is from/to the same host/port;
0 otherwise
discrete
wrong_fragment number of "wrong" fragments continuous
urgent number of urgent packets continuous
Table 1.3: Content features within a connection suggested by domain knowledge
feature name description type
hot number of "hot" indicators continuous
num_failed_logins number of failed login attempts continuous
logged_in 1 if successfully logged in; 0 otherwise discrete
num_compromised number of "compromised" conditions continuous
root_shell 1 if root shell is obtained; 0 otherwise discrete
su_attempted 1 if "su root" command attempted; 0 otherwise discrete
num_root number of "root" accesses continuous
num_file_creations number of file creation operations continuous
num_shells number of shell prompts continuous
num_access_files number of operations on access control files continuous
num_outbound_cmds number of outbound commands in an ftp ses-
sion
continuous
is_hot_login 1 if the login belongs to the "hot" list; 0 other-
wise
discrete
is_guest_login 1 if the login is a "gues" login; 0 otherwise discrete
16
1.4. Structure of Thesis
Table 1.4: Time-based traffic features computed using a two-second time window
feature name description type
count number of connections to the same host as the
current connection in the past two seconds
continuous
Note: The following features refer to these
same-host connections.
serror_rate % of connections that have "SYN" errors continuous
rerror_rate % of connections that have "REJ" errors continuous
same_srv_rate % of connections to the same service continuous
diff_srv_rate % of connections to different services continuous
srv_count number of connections to the same service as
the current connection in the past two seconds
continuous
Note: The following features refer to these
same-service connections.
srv_serror_rate % of connections that have "SYN" errors continuous
srv_rerror_rate % of connections that have "REJ" errors continuous
srv_diff_host_rate % of connections to different hosts continuous
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Table 1.5: Connection-based traffic features
feature name description type
dst_host_count count of connections having the
same destination host
continuous
dst_host_srv_count count of connections having the
same destination host and using
the same service
continuous
dst_host_same_srv_rate % of connections having the same
destination host and using the
same service
continuous
dst_host_diff_srv_rate % of different services on the cur-
rent host
continuous
dst_host_same_src_port_rate % of connections to the current
host having the same src port
continuous
dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate % of connections to the same ser-
vice coming from different hosts
continuous
dst_host_serror_rate % of connections to the current
host that have an S0 error
continuous
dst_host_srv_serror_rate % of connections to the current
host and specified service that have
an S0 error
continuous
dst_host_rerror_rate % of connections to the current
host that have an RST error
continuous
dst_host_srv_error_rate % of connections to the current






T HE detection of network attacks is a important task for network operators intoday’s Internet. The principal challenge in automatically detecting network
attacks is that these are a moving and ever-growing target[58, 169]. Intrusion
detection systems usually detect anomaly attacks by monitoring packets. We often
use machine learning technologies to identify whether traffic data is normal or
anomalous[54]. Two common machine learning methods are classification-based
and clustering-based. But some of the methods lose effectiveness or even become
invalid in this area since data volume is often very large. Moreover, traffic data
for the network contains many features, and some of the features are irrelevant or
redundant. Thus, we usually use feature selection algorithm to remove irrelevant
and redundant features. This chapter will introduce intrusion detection system,
feature selection, and machine learning methods.
2.1 Intrusion Detection System
Intrusion detection system (IDS) is used to moniter malicious events on computers
or networks. IDS could discover attack indications and illegal actions which break
security policy in systems or networks. A good IDS can not only help a network
administrator understand attacks occuring in a network system at any time, but also
provide an important basis to constitute network security defence policy[40, 150].
Research of intrusion detection technologies come from 1980s. Since Denning
proposed the first IDS model in 1985, more and more researchers have done lots of
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work on how to construct an effective IDS model. Since IDS needs to detect, defend
against and respond to computer attacks, researchers have to consider many problems
when they construct IDS models. Such as data collection, intrusion identifying,
reporting and response. The structure of IDS construction is shown in figure 2.1.
IDS is composed by four parts as follows[118, 131].
1. Monitoring object. It is monitored and it can be a host or a network.
2. Data collection and storage. This part collects all data from every event, and
converts the data to a proper format to store.
3. Data analysis and management. This is a core part in IDS. It searches suspected
actions and generates a signal when it detects an attack. Then, IDS deals with
the attack or send a signal to network administrator to handle.
4. Signal. It can be seen as an output of IDS. The output is an automatic response
or an alarm to network adminstrator.
Figure 2.1: IDS structure
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2.1.1 Brief history of IDS
In 1980, Anderson J P. put forward the concept of an intrusion detection. He defines
intrusion attempt or threat as an attempt caused the system to be unavailable or unre-
liable by unauthorized access information or operating information[4]. Anderson J P.
proposed intrusion detection idea according to audit record of operating system. But
researchers has paid little attention to this idea, focusing instead on encryption and
denial of access to the data from an authenticated host[86]. In 1985, Denning D E.
proposed a IDS model which is called Intrusion Detection Expert System (IDES). And
it is composed by host, object, audit record, profile characteristic, anomaly record
and activity rules[39]. This model is independant from system platform, application
enviroment, system weakness and types of attack. And the model provides a general
framework for IDS. In 1988, Teresa L improved the model and created a real time
IDS that detected attacks as data was received[119]. And Teresa’s model is used
to detect intrusions behavior for a single host. In 1990, Heberlein L T presented
network-based intrusion detection, and proposed Network Security Monitor (NSM)
which detects suspicious behavior by monitoring network data in local area network,
rather than checking audit record in host.
From 1990s, the research on intrusion detection is increasing gradually. Some
American research institutions combined host-based IDS with NIDS together, design
a distributed IDS[186]. Crosbie M and Spafford G use autonomous agents to improve
the scalability, maintainability, efficiency and fault tolerance of intrusion detection
system[34]. Sandeep Kumar studied IDS based on immune principle[151, 155].
Anderson R introduced the information retrieval technology into the field of intrusion
detection[6]. Lane T studied anomaly detection of user’s behavior based on machine
learning[95, 96]. Lee W applied data mining approaches on IDS[179].
2.1.2 Classification of IDS
Based on the four parts of IDS in figure 2.1, we could divide IDS into different
categories. According to difference of data collection and storage, IDS be classified to
Host-based IDS (HIDS), application-based and Network Intrusion Detection System
(NIDS). It is shown in figure 2.2. NIDS takes raw packets in network as data source.
Sensors collects packets from a protected network to determine whether the network
is normal or not. Response module will alarm to administrator when sensors detect an
attack[107, 128]. A HIDS emerges from 1980s, and the network has not developed
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as common and complex as today’s. Thus, it usually monitors packet based on a
host and compare packets’ behaviour with signature. And it will alerts users when
an attack is detected. Sensors of host-based IDS get history audit data from host
operating system. Application-based IDS run on individual host as well. And sensors
of application-based IDS gain log files from uses’ application and software[25, 43].
Figure 2.2: IDS classification based on data collection and storage
On the basis of difference of data analysis and process unit, IDS can be separated
into misuse detection and anomaly detection. It is shown in figure 2.3. Misuse
detection is used to analyze and detect intrusion. This method generally takes
intrusion behavior as a pattern or a character. And it establishes a intrusion mode
characteristic database based on known intrusions behavior patterns. The detection
will be monitoring system or the user’s actual behavior patterns and match them with
the database. According to the results of the matching, the system will determine
whether there is a intrusion [82]. Supervised machine-learning methods could help
to compose signatures. Misuse detection systems are highly effective to detect those
attacks which they are programmed to alert on. However, they cannot detect new
attacks, since they cannot recognize those attacks which do not match their lists of
signatures[145, 77]. Misuse detection based intrusion systems can be divide into
stateless and stateful. Stateless misuse detection systems use only existing signature.
However, stateful misuse detection systems use not only existing signatures, but also
previous signatures[140]. On the contrary, anomaly detection will create a normal
operation model for users. Any operation does not comply with the normal behavior
will be prevented. Anomaly detection principle is take every exception as a possible
attack. Thus, this detection method can detect unknown attacks[22]. Anomaly
detection based intrusion system can also be further classified into self-learning and
rule-based. The difference is that rule-based intrusion detection system will be fully
specified in advance of normal rules. But self-learning systems typically need to have
a training process, which can let the system know what is normal network behavior.
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Figure 2.3: IDS classification based on data analysis and process
In accordance with the reponse mechanism, IDS falls into reactive response IDS
and passive response IDS. And according to usage frequency, IDS can be divided into
online IDS and offline IDS.
2.1.3 Approaches to Intrusion Detection
As it is shown in section 2.1.2, intrusion detection can be classified in several different
ways. One way commonly used is according to data analysis and process unit. As
stated above, misuse detection uses a abnormal behavior rule database to distinguish
whether an action is an attack. Any action consistent with the rules in the database
will be prevented. Rule also named as signature and is constructed by malicious
pattern. Misuse detection has a strong detection ability, its disadvantage is the need
to update the pattern database, and it is difficult to detect unknown intrusion. The
core of the misuse detection is how to express the intrusion behavior, and how to
make the intrusion actions to ensure its completeness. As new types of attack and
network vulnerabilities occur constantly, it is impossible to keep the pattern database
reflecting the potential attacks. This is main reason to affect false negative rate.The
current misuse detection mainly has three methods as follows.
1. Simple pattern matching
Simple pattern matching is the most common method of misuse detection,
which has the advantages of being easy to implement, with high detection
efficiency, and strong real-time performance, but can only be applied to a
relatively simple attack mode, and false positive rate is high[42, 136]. The
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well-known network intrusion detection tool Snort uses the simple pattern
matching method. It uses rule base to describe the intrusion behavior that has
been known and the rule base uses the text file to store. It has good readability
and can be modified[170, 15].
2. Expert system
Expert system is one of the earliest misuse detection schemes, and has been
adopted by many classical intrusion detection models. When the expert system
works, user have to input the information of the known intrusion behavior to
the expert system in the form special format which is expert system required.
Expert system constructs a rule base by using these information. The expert
system matches the corresponding observation events and rules in the rule
base to determine whether the intrusion occurs. For users, the expert system
is an autonomous "black box", users do not need to understand or interfere
with their internal reasoning and decision-making process[62, 33]. The main
problems existing in the expert system are the maintenance of the rule base is
complex, and we need to consider the relationship between the rules when
changing the rules. And another problem is the low efficiency in dealing with
massive data[14, 70].
3. State transition diagram
State transition analysis using state transition diagrams to represent and detect
known intrusions. In a state transition diagram, an intrusion behavior is
represented as a series of state transfer processes, and the process starts from
an initial state until the final state is invaded. The advantages of state transition
analysis are as follows[149]. First, it does not depend directly on the detailed
data, but identifies the key features of intrusion activities that need to be
detected. Second, it can be detected before the invasion has been completed,
so as to facilitate the timely response measures to prevent the invasion. Third, it
can detect slow attack and cooperative attack[177, 184]. The weakness of state
transition analysis are as follows. First, since the state transition diagram can
describe the intrusion behavior which have to cause the obvious system state
change, many intrusion behaviors can not be described by the state transition
diagram. Second, intrusion behavior is simply described as a state sequence,
some of the more complex behavior can not be described, such as concurrency,
conditions, etc.. Third, the state transition diagram need to determine whether
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the system behavior meets the requirements of the intrusion proposition before
it is checked and matched[68].
Anomaly detection will judges a intrusion when there is a certain difference between
monitored system or the user’s actual behavior and normal behavior[103, 176]. The
advantage of anomaly detection is that there is no need to have much knowledge
about system defects, and has strong adaptability, which can detect unknown in-
trusions or new intrusion patterns. The core problem of anomaly detection is how
to represent the normal behavior of the system or the user. The current anomaly
detection mainly has three methods as follows[98, 91].
1. Statistical method
Anomaly detection based on statistical method is the use of specific statistical
model of the system or the user normal behavior for learning. And it identifies
abnormal behavior which is a deviation behavior compare with normal behavior
based on large statistical data. The key of statistical method is the selection
of statistical object and statistical model, and the training of statistical model.
The following are some of the possible statistical object[78].
a) User login and activity
User login frequency, activity duration, password error number, etc..
b) Command and program execution
Command execution frequency, the use of the program running, etc.
c) The operation of the file
File read, write, create, delete frequency and the failure frequency of
these operations, etc..
This method is not very difficult to select the appropriate statistical model
for the specific intrusion detection. And it can be seen as its advantage.The
weakness is the threshold value is difficult to determine, too large or too small
value will affect the accuracy of detection. Moreover, many of the system or
user behavior is very difficult to use simple statistical model to describe, and
the complex statistical model requires high calculation[120].
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2. Anomaly detection based on Immune Principle
Biological immune system against pathogens or non detection of the orga-
nization itself is quite precise and recognition of "self/nonself" is one of the
most basic and most important functions[53]. The researchers in the United
States have found a certain similarity between the biological immune system
and the computer system security protection mechanism. This method using
system calls as audit data, through the fixed length sequences of system calls
to describe process privilege of normal behavior profile and sequence between
the "distance" as reflected in the differences between the patterns of behavior
measure[117]. Experiments show that the anomaly detection system based on
immune principle can detect many attacks that exploit the vulnerability of the
program. However, this detection method has a limitation that it could only
detect the attacks who use the privilege of the process [56].
3. Artificial neural network
Artificial neural network is a kind of artificial intelligence method, which is
based on the understanding of the structure and operation mechanism of
human brain. Artificial neural network model is based on the mathematical
model of neuron. Artificial neural network models are represented by neural
networks, network topology and learning rules[135]. Artificial neural network
has the ability of massively parallel processing and distributed information
storage, good adaptive, self-organizing, and strong learning function, associa-
tive function and fault tolerance function[137]. When the traditional method
is unable to solve or the effect is not good or when the characteristics of the
original data is not understood or can not be described by a mathematical
model, the neural network can show the superiority[17].
Artificial neural network has two ways to detect anomalies. One method use a
large number of instances to train neural network and it gains knowledge of
normal behaviour. And anomaly behaviours could be detected by comparison
with knowledge. Another method is to train neural network by users’ represen-
tative command sequence. And then the network could create characteristics
table for users. The network’s prediction error rate for next event can measure
the abnormal degree of user behaviour.
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2.1.4 Challenges in Intrusion Detection
Intrusion detection will develop towards distributed, intelligent, high detection speed,
high accuracy and high security. And the research focus of intrusion detection will
include the following.
1. Distributed intrusion detection
Distributed intrusion detection system is mainly for large networks and het-
erogeneous system, which uses distributed structure, collaborative processing
and analysis of a variety of information, and a single architecture of intrusion
detection system compared with greater detection ability[76].
2. Intelligent intrusion detection
Intelligent intrusion detection method is the present stage, including machine
learning, neural networks, data mining, and other methods. It has carried
out various intelligent techniques in the application and research of intrusion
detection. The main purpose of the study is reduced detection system false
alarm and false alarm probability, improve the system self learning ability and
real-time response. From the current research results, the intrusion detection
method based on intelligent technology has many advantages, and has good
development potential[20].
3. Intrusion detection based on protocol analysis
The calculation amount of intrusion detection based on protocol analysis is
relatively small. It can be used to detect the presence of a high degree of
regularity of network protocol, even in high load network, it is not easy to
generate packet loss[11].
4. Combined with operating system
Closely integrated with the operating system can enhance the intrusion detec-
tion system to new attack detection capabilities.
5. Application layer intrusion detection
The semantics of many intrusions can be understood only in the application
layer, and the detection of this kind of intrusion needs to be realized by analyz-
ing the application layer[192].
27
2. BACKGROUND
6. High speed packet capture technology
For network intrusion detection system, high-speed packet capture can reduce
the resource consumption and improve the detection speed.
7. Efficient pattern matching algorithm
As intrusions become more diverse and complex, more and more complex
models need to be stored in rule base. And complexity of intrusion model
definition are higher and higher. Therefore, it is urgent to research and use
efficient pattern matching algorithm[178].
8. Test and evaluation of intrusion detection system
The establishment of common intrusion detection system evaluation method
and testing platform, which is very important to promote the application and
popularization of intrusion detection system, has become another important
direction of intrusion detection research[65].
9. Standardization of intrusion detection system.
There is no formal international standards of intrusion detection system so
far. And it is not conducive to the development and application of intrusion
detection system.
10. The interaction between intrusion detection system and intrusion detection
system and other security components.
Intrusion detection system could combine with other IDS or security compo-
nents by cascaded connection or integration.
11. Research on the security of intrusion detection system itself.
Intrusion detection system has its own security problem as well. And there
should be research on how to protect itself against network attacks.
2.2 Feature Selection
Feature selection is defined as follows: given a set of candidate features, select
a subset or a feature that performs the best under some classification algorithms.
This process can reduce not only the cost of recognition by reducing the number of
features, but also provide a better classification accuracy due to finite dataset size
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effects[71]. From the definition of feature selection, we could see evaluation criteria
are very important when given a specific learning algorithm and a dataset[143, 83].
Generally, a feature selection algorithm includes four parts which are shown in figure
2.4, generation, evaluation, stopping criterion and validation. Feature selection
process is can be seen as removing irrelevant and redundant features. Irrelevant
means features have little correlation with class labels. And redundant features
have strong relationship with selected features. Thus, both irrelevant and redundant
features are no help for classification.
The candidate subset generation is a process of searching feature subsets, and
the obtained subset will be used as input for evaluation function. The selection
of the initial subset is the start of the feature selection algorithm, and the starting
point of subset generation process, which is divided into three categories. (1) Initial
subset is empty. In the process of searching, the algorithm adds candidate features
to candidate subset one by one. This method is called forward search. (2) Initial
subset is the same as feature set of a given dataset. And it excludes irrelevant or
redundant features from the initial subset step by step in the search process, namely
the backward search. (3) The initial subset is generated randomly, then the feature
is added or deleted one by one in the search process[97, 161].
The evaluation function is used to evaluate the merits of the candidate subset
obtained by the search. It will compare evaluation value with the best optimal value
stored before. If the evaluation value is higher, the primary candidate subset will be
replaced[168, 114].
Appropriate termination conditions can avoid exhaustive or infinite loop state in
feature search procedure. The subset search be applied to strategy and evaluation
function is an important factor that influences the selection of termination condition.
The best feature subset search strategy can improve the speed of feature selection to
find the optimal solution[160]. And better evaluation function can ensure that the
selected feature subset has higher classification distinguishing ability, and improve
the performance of the algorithm. The termination condition based on search
strategy can be feature number achieve the specified threshold or the iterations
number of search achieve the specified threshold. Termination criteria based on
evaluation function can be optimal solution has been found or could not obtain a
higher evaluation value by increase or decrease the number of feature subset[108].
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Figure 2.4: Feature selection process
Validation part verifies the the classification effectiveness performance of the
feature selection results in certain conditions. It is not a part of feature selection
process but is necessary in the practical application. Validation is usually to train
and test feature subset in some kind of classifier and compare prediction results with
original dataset results, or other feature selection results[183]. Comparison may be
classification accuracy or computational complexity and so on.
2.2.1 Feature Selection evaluation measure
There are four main models dealing with feature selection: wrapper methods, filter
methods, hybrid methods and embedded methods. It is shown in figure 2.5. In
the embedded model, feature selection is integrated into the process of training
for given methods. For example, some decision tree algorithms like ID3, C4.5 or
Breiman’s CART algorithm. These algorithms choose the best feature which is good
for classification in each node. And then they split sub-space based on selected feature.
The algorithms repeat this process until termination condition is reached[19, 74].
Embedded methods attempt to find an optimal subset of features in the process of
model building. These methods depend directly on the nature of the classification
method used[55]. In general, embedded methods present important advantages
in terms of variable and model interaction, capturing accurately the dependencies
between variables, being computationally less demanding than wrapper methods.
However, these techniques are conceptually more complex, and modifications to the
classification algorithm may lead to a poor performance[122].
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Figure 2.5: Types of feature selection evaluation measure
Filter methods’ evaluation criteria are independent of learning algorithms and
they mainly identify a feature subset from the original space on the basis of given
evaluation criteria. It is described by figure 2.6. The evaluation criteria depends
on datasets and filter methods usually select a feature or subset who could achieve
highest degree relate to objective function. And it is generally considered that
selected feature or subset has higher accuracy for learning algorithms. There are
many evaluation methods for filter, such as inconsistency, correlation, information
gain and so on [189, 57]. Filter methods have low computational complexity, high
efficiency, strong versatility, are suitable for the large-scale data[94, 122].
Figure 2.6: Filter-based feature selection flow
Wrapper methods was first proposed by John in 1994 and it is shown in figure
2.7[75]. Wrapper methods optimize a classifier as part of the selection process and
choose those features with high prediction performance induced by specified learning
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algorithms [121, 154]. Selected feature subset will vary depending on different
learning algorithms. Therefore, the best evaluation criteria is the performance of
learning algorithm which is used on selected feature subset. Wrapper methods have
no limitation to learning algorithms. And decision tree, KNN, bayesian network and
SVM could all be used for wrapper methods[57, 84]. In general, wrapper methods
could get better subsets than filter methods. But they take long processing times,
have low adaptability and need to train for different learning algorithms.
Figure 2.7: Wrapper-based feature selection flow
Hybrid methods combine filter method and wrapper method and take advantage
of both of them [101, 134]. The hybrid mechanism is typically by two steps. At first,
candidate features are preprocessed by filter methods and irrelevant features are
removed. Thus, the dimension of dataset could be reduced. Then, Hybrid methods
select features by wrapper methods and classification learning algorithm is used to
evaluate the selected subsets[63, 195].
2.2.2 Feature Selection Approaches
In this section, some feature selection approaches are introduced. They are used to
compare with proposed algorithms in the following chapters.
2.2.2.1 DMIFS
Feature selection using dynamic mutual information (DMIFS) was proposed by
Huawen Liu in 2009[115]. As it is shown in algorithm 2.2.1, T denotes training
32
2.2. Feature Selection
dataset and it is described as D(F, C). C represents class labels. And S and F are
selected and candidate feature subsets, respectively. DMIFS uses semi-supervised
learning method which combine supervised and unsupervised methods. And semi-
supervised learning takes advantage of labeled instances and unlabeled instances to
do training and classification.
Normally, we can divide the instances in T = D(F, C) into two types: labeled and
unlabeled. We set the stopping condition as that when the selected features have the
same information as the original features, the selection procedure will cease, which
is frequently used in feature selection. When there are still unlabeled instances in
D, the procedure will continue and pick out the candidate features from F . Assume
that S is the subset of selected features, and the instances D are classified into two
categories according to the labels C . Du and Dl are unlabeled and labeled instances
respectively.
Algorithm 2.2.1: Feature selection using dynamic mutual information
Input: A training dataset T = D(F, C)
Output: Selected features S
1 Initialize relative parameters: F← ’initial set of all features’, C← ’class labels’,
S = ;, Du = D, Dl = ; ;
2 repeat
3 for each feature f ∈ F do
4 Calculate its mutual information I(C; f ) on Du ;
5 if I(C; f ) = 0 then
6 F = F − { f }
7 Choose the feature f with highest I(C; f ) ;
8 S = S ∪ { f } F = F \ { f } ;
9 Obtain new labeled instances Dl from Du induced by f ;
10 Remove them from Du, Du = Du \ Dl ;
11 until F = ; or Du = IT ;
12 Return Selected features: S.
The algorithm estimates mutual information for each candidate feature in F
with the label C . When the mutual information of feature is zero, the feature will
be eliminated from F during the calculation. So the probability distribution of the
feature is completely random, and the feature will not be used in the prediction of
the unlabeled instances Du, to make sure that the feature with the highest mutual
information will be selected. In order to ensure that the selected feature will not be
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re-calculated in the estimation of mutual information in the next round, the selected
feature will be kept aside and later discarded from Du, since new labeled instances Dl
will be produced from Du. After that, the algorithm runs into next round and picks
up other candidate features. The procedure will continue until no candidate features
in F or the number of the unlabeled instances is equal to inconsistency count of T.
2.2.2.2 mRMR
Maximum relevance minimum redundancy (mRMR) was proposed by Hanchuan in
2005[148]. Assume S and C are selected feature subset and class labels respectively.
This algorithm is based on mutual information, and the purpose of feature selection is
to find a feature set S with m features fi, which jointly have the largest dependency on
the target class C . It is called Max-Dependency, shown as formula 2.1. I(.) denotes
mutual information.
max D(S, C), D = I({ fi, i = 1, ..., m}; C) (2.1)
As Max-Dependency criterion is not easy to implement since it is often hard to
get an accurate estimation for multivariate density which is used to caculate Max-
Dependency. An alternative method is to select features based on maximal relevance
criterion (Max-Relevance). Max-Relevance is to search features satisfying 2.2.





I( fi; C) (2.2)
It is likely that features selected according to Max-Relevance could have rich
redundancy. When two features highly depend on each other, the respective class-
discriminative power would not change much if either was removed. Therefore,
equation 2.3 minimal redundancy (Min-Redundancy) condition can be added to





fi , f j∈S
I( fi; f j) (2.3)
The criterion combining the above two constraints is called "minimal-redundancy-
maximal-relevance" (mRMR). Φ(D, R) denotes a operator which combine D and R.
It is shown in 2.4.
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maxΦ(D, R), Φ= D− R (2.4)
In practice, incremental search methods can be used to find the near-optimal
features defined by Φ(.). Suppose we already have Sm−1, the feature set with m− 1
features. F is original feature set. The task is to select the mth feature from the set
{F −Sm−1}. This is done by selecting the feature that maximizes Φ(.). The respective
incremental algorithm optimizes 2.5.
max
f j∈F−Sm−1





I( f j; fi)] (2.5)
The algorithm 2.2.2 describes mRMR feature selection scheme. To select the
candidate feature set, the algorithm computes the cross validation classification error
for a large number of features and finds a relatively stable range of small error. This
range is called Ω. The optimal number of features which is denoted as n∗ of the
candidate set is determined within Ω.
Algorithm 2.2.2: Maximum relevance minimum redundancy algorithm
Input: A training dataset T = D(F, C), number of features to be selected n∗
Output: Selected features Sn∗
1 Initialize relative parameters: F← ’initial set of all features’, C← ’class labels’,
S = ; ;
2 for each feature f ∈ F do





I( f j; fi)] ;
4 Get sequential feature sets S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ ... ⊂ Sn−1 ⊂ Sn ;
5 for each k ∈ S1, ..., Sk, ...Sn do
6 Find Ω within which the respective error ek is consistently small ;
7 Within Ω, find the smallest classification error e∗ =min ek ;
8 n∗ is chosen as the smallest k that corresponds to e∗ ;
9 Return Selected features: Sn∗ .
2.2.2.3 IG
Information gain (IG) uses Shannon’s entropy to measure feature set quality [113].







PD(ci) log2 PD(ci) (2.6)
the information for Dj due to partitioning D at f is




PD fj (ci) log2 PD fj (ci) (2.7)
and the information gain due to feature f is defined as






I(D fj ) (2.8)
where |D| is the number of instances in D, and PD(ci) are priors for data D.
A feature ordering algorithm using information gain is shown in 2.2.3.
Algorithm 2.2.3: Feature selection according to information gains
Input: A training dataset T = D(F, C), number of features to be selected L
Output: Selected features S
1 Initialize relative parameters: F← fi, i = 1, 2, ...n, C← ’class labels’, S = ; ;
2 for each feature fi ∈ F do
3 Calculate its information gain IG( fi) ;
4 insert fi into S in descending order with regard to IG( fi) ;
5 Retain first L feature in S, and delete the others ;
6 Return Selected features: S.
2.2.2.4 ReliefF
Relief is a series of algorithms. It includes Relief, ReliefF and RReliefF. Relief was
proposed by Kira and it is a feature weighting algorithm. Relief algorithm is simple
and has high efficiency, but it is limited to dealing with two label classification. In
1994, Kononenko expanded it to ReliefF algorithm. ReliefF could process multi-
label[88]. In 1997, Kononenko improved ReliefF to RReliefF which could handle
continuous value of target attributes[89]. We will introduce ReliefF which is used in
chapter 7 to compare with proposed algorithms. In fact, ReliefF’s estimate W [A] of
attributes A is an approximation of the following difference of probabilities:


















The key idea of ReliefF is to estimate attributes according to how well their values
distinguish among instances that are near each other. For that purpose ReliefF for
a given instance searches for its two nearest neighbours: one from the same class
(called nearest hit) and the other from different class(called nearest miss).
In equation 2.9, di f f (A, R1, R2) represents the difference of sample R1 and R2
on feature A. And it could be calculated by 2.10. H j(C) is jth near hits in class C.







max(A)−min(A) , i f A is continuous
0, i f A is discrete and R1[A] = R2[A]
1, i f A is discrete and R1[A] 6= R2[A]
(2.10)
ReliefF algorithm is shown in 2.2.4. ReliefF has high efficiency and has no limits
of data types. But this algorithm could not remove redundant features.
Algorithm 2.2.4: ReliefF feature selection algorithm
Input: A training dataset D, m← ’sample size’, δ← ’feature weight threshold’,
k← ’Number of nearest hit’
Output: Selected feature subset S whose feature weight larger than δ
1 Initialize feature weight W (A) = 0, S = ; ;
2 for i=1 to m do
3 Pick at random an instance R ∈ D ;
4 Pick at random k nearest hit of R, i.e. H j (j=1,2,...,k), and k nearest miss of
R, i.e. M j(C) ;
5 for A=1 to N do
6 W (A) =W (A)−
∑k







j=1 di f f (A, R, H j(C))]/(mk)
8 for A=1 to N do
9 if W (A)≤ δ then
10 S = S
⋃
A;
11 Return Selected features: S.
Some of my proposed algoithms are based on mutual information. Therefore, we
choose some algorithms which are based on information entropy to compare, such
as DMIFS, mRMR, and IG. And we also investigate the relationship between features




2.3 Network Anomaly Detection by Machine
Learning
Anomaly intrusion detection can be seen as a classification problem, and machine
learning theory could be used in this field[1, 194]. Figure 2.8 shows the process
of knowledge discovery proposed by Richard[73]. From figure 2.8 we can see
that feature selection is a data preprocessing task before using machine learning
training algorithm. Machine learning algorithms help to create model to distinguish
normal and attack instances[22]. There are two types of classification for intrusion
detection according to class labels, two class or multiple class [18, 165]. A two class
problem regards all attacks as anomaly instances. While a multiple class problem
handles all attacks as different labels. Intrusion detection datasets usually have
large number of instances and features. And some features may be irrelevant and
redundant. Therefore, feature selection could apply on this kind of classification
domain [36, 141].
Figure 2.8: Process of knowledge discovery
Feature selection problem can be characterised in the context of machine learning.
Assume that T = D(F, C) is a training dataset with m instances and n features,
where D = o1, o2, . . . , om and F = f1, f2, . . . , fn are the sets of instances and features.
C = c1, c2, . . . , ck refers to the set of class labels. For each instance o j ∈ D, it can be
denoted as a value vector of features, i.e., o j = (v j1, v j2, . . . , v jn), v ji is the value of o j
corresponding to the feature fi.
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Given a training dataset T = D(F, C), the task of learning algorithms for classi-
fication is to induce a hypothesis h: Fi → C from T , where Fi is the value domain
of fi ∈ F . Since there is a limited number of instances in D, there is a classification
error εF(h) = |(o, c) ∈ F |h(o) 6= c|/m for each classifier, where h(o) is the predicted
class label of o by the hypothesis h. Feature selection can change F , and result in
the changing of εF(h). After feature selection process, datasets are reduced and then
learning methods are used on datasets for classification.
As stated above, there are two learning methods. One is supervised methods and
they are based on classifiers, such as C4.5 [133], Bayesian [2, 127], ID3, JRip, PART,
SMO and IBK algorithms.
Another one is unsupervised methods and they are based on clustering methods,
such as Fuzzy C Means, Sub-Space Clustering (SSC) [144], Density-based Clustering
[48], and Evidence Accumulation Clustering (EAC) techniques [44]. One advantage
of unsupervised methods is that they could detect unknown attacks[104, 150].
As mentioned above, feature selection algorithms could be classified into three
categories, filter, wrapper and hybrid. Filter methods are not depend on learning
algorithms and they have better performance on dealing with massive data or online
data. And filter methods evaluate whether features are important or not by their
inherent characteristics, such as distance function, rough set, mutual information,
independent component analysis and statistical correlation coefficient [173, 29].
Relief algorithm proposed by Kira and improved algorithm ReliefF are based on
Euclidean distance [87]. Hu introduced Neighborhood Margin(NM) and Neigh-
borhood Soft Margin(NSM) to measure minimum distance. And he uses NSM to
evaluate the quality of candidate subsets [64]. Zhang proposed a consistency mea-
surement which is named Pairwise Constraints to evaluate subsets [191]. Rough set
is proposed by Pawlak in 1982 and it is an effective way to deal with the uncertain
information[106]. Richard presented new feature selection algorithms combined
rough and fuzzy sets[73]. Abe and Kudo put forward a method to select the most
relevant features with class labels by Bayes boundary error [66].
Wrapper methods use machine learning algorithm as the prediction performance
evaluation criteria of the feature subset. Huang proposed a hybrid genetic algorithm
based on information theory[67]. And he used the algorithm and classifier to get sub-
sets. Jarvis and Goodacre use genetic algorithm as well to select the best subset[41].
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Kabir put forward a algorithm based on neural network[79]. Inza takes Bayes
network into wrapper algorithms and get improved classification performance[69].
The degree of relevance within a feature subset is very important to the perfor-
mance of feature selection. Generally, there are two methods to measure relevance
between features, linear correlation measurement and correlation measurement
based on information theory. BIF feature selection algorithm using mutual informa-
tion to measure the degree of relevance between the features and the class labels,
and output K highest degree features as the optimal feature subset [72]. This method
can effectively eliminate the irrelevant features, but the selected features still have a
large number of redundant features. Battiti put forward a feature selection algorithm
based on mutual information (MIFS) [13]. This algorithm uses mutual information
to measure the relevance between features and class labels. At the same time, it also
calculates relevance degree between a candidate feature and the selected feature set.
However, the MIFS algorithm has lower robustness and when facing the redundant
features is highly correlated to class labels. Kwak and Choi introduced MIFS-U algo-
rithm which uses uncertainty coefficient to represent relevance degree of features
[93]. Peng proposed Max-Relevance and Min-Redundancy algorithm and it uses
mutual information to evaluate features [148]. Lee introduced information gain and
divergence-based feature selection algorithm. The algorithm obtains feature subset
by deleting the redundant features while maintaining the information gain [99]. [3]
proposed mutual information-based feature selection method results in detecting
intrusions with higher accuracy.
Unsupervised methods also could be used to perform feature selection. For
example, mRR uses conditional mutual information to measure the relevance between
features. And correlated instances are clustered based on hierarchical clustering
technology, so as to remove the redundant features [123]. ACA uses a function in
information theory to measure dependancy between features. Features dependent on
each other will form a cluster and then it selects representive features from clusters.
Thus, the redundant features could be removed [9]. FCBF algorithm measures the
relevance of features by symmetrical uncertainty. And it also proposed a feature
selection algorithm which can remove redundant features effectively [190].
Chapter 3, 4, 5 propose four supervised algorithms and chapter 6 describes two
unsupervised algorithms. And they will be introduced specifically in the following
chapters. All of the supervised algorithms use filter method and some of them
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take advantage of mutual information to measure the relevance between features.
Two supervised algorithms improve Battiti’s MIFS algorithm and mRMR algorithm
respectively. Another two supervised algorithms take advantage of feature grouping
and hierachical clustering and combine them together. One unsupervised algorithm
combine supervised algorithm with itself. Another clustering algorithm improves
evidence accumulation clustering algorithm. All the six algorithms are tested on
KDD 99 dataset and intrusion detection classification is considered as a two class
problem. In other words, every instance in KDD 99 dataset is labeled either anomaly
or normal data.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, intrusion detection and feature selection are introduced. Intrusion
detection is not a new research area but it is an important area since new chal-
lenges and new attacks emerge continuously. The history and challenges are briefly
described in this chapter, and some solutions for IDS are also introduced.
Since both instance and features in IDS data usually very huge, we use feature
selection method to reduce dimensionality and remove irrelevant and redundant
features. And feature selection could also help improving classification accuracy.
In this chapter, we introduced feature selection models and some feature selection
algorithms. These algorithms will be used to compare with proposed algorithms in
following chapters. Machine learning methods using on network anomaly detection
are briefly set forth in this chapter as well. Some literatures mentioned in this part





Feature Selection for Intrusion
Detection Systems in Decision Tree
Learning
T HIS chapter proposes a modified mutual information-based feature selectionalgorithm (MMIFS) for intrusion detection on the KDD Cup 99 dataset. The C4.5
classification method was used with this feature selection method. In comparison
with dynamic mutual information feature selection algorithm (DMIFS), we can see
that most performance aspects are improved. Furthermore, this chapter shows the
relationship between performance, efficiency and the number of features selected.
3.1 Mutual Information-based Feature Selection
Method Introduction
3.1.1 Mutual Information
When Information theory was firstly designed to measure the size of the information
magnitude in data communication, entropy is an important measurement [188, 46].
It is used to quantify the uncertainty of random variables, and also to effectively scale
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the information amount among them. We only talk about finite random variables
with discrete values within this chapter [45].
If X is a random variable with discrete values, its entropy is defined as




where H() is entropy, and p(x) = Pr(X = x) is the probability density function of
X . Note Entropy is dependent on the distribution of the probability of the random
variable.
If conditional entropy is defined as the uncertainty reduction in one variable
while the other is known, assume variable Y is given, the conditional entropy H(X |Y )
of X with respect to Y is





p(x , y)logp(x |y) (3.2)
where p(x , y) is the joint probability density function and p(x |y) is the posterior
probabilities of X given Y .
Also the joint entropy H(X , Y ) of X and Y is
H(X , Y ) = H(X ) +H(Y |X )






p(x , y)logp(x , y)
(3.3)
In order to quantify the amount of information shared by two variables X and Y ,
a termed mutual information I(X ; Y ) is introduced as
I(X ; Y ) = H(X )−H(X |Y )










When X and Y are unrelated, the value of I(X ; Y ) is 0. While I(X ; Y ) is high,
it means X and Y are closely related. The mutual information is applicable in the
evaluation of any arbitrary dependency between random variables. Within this
chapter, we only compute the mutual information between two variables, and scale
the mutual dependence between them [163].
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3.1.2 Application to Feature Selection
The central assumption when using a feature selection technique is that the data
contains many redundant or irrelevant features. Redundant features are those which
provide no more information than the currently selected features, and irrelevant
features provide no useful information in any context. Figure 3.1 shows analysis
of features relevance and redundancy[182]. Feature selection is used to remove
irrelevant and redundant features from datasets. Irrelevant features can be easily
removed and strongly relevant features are easily found by relevance analysis. So
removing redundant features is a very important task for optimal feature selection
process. And redundant features are usually in weakly relevant features. Our
work is trying to remove irrelevant and redundant features effectively. In KDD99
dataset, some features may be irrelevant and others may be redundant since the
information they add is contained in other features. These extra features can increase
computation time for creating classifications, and can have an impact on the accuracy
of the classifier built. For this reason, this classification domain seems to be suitable
for the application of feature selection methods. These methods are centered in
obtaining a subset of features that adequately describe the problem at hand without
degrading performance.
Figure 3.1: Features relevance and redundancy analysis
To verify that there are irrelevant and redundant features in KDD Cup 99 dataset,
Correlation based Feature Selection (CFS) is used to select 8 features by Weka.
Two performance measures (precision and F-measure) were calculated which will
specifically be discussed in section 3.3.2 and we used four classification methods to
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calculate the two performances. Figure 3.2 shows the precision comparison between
41 features and 8 features by normal and anomaly types respectively. Similarity,
figure 3.3 describes the other performance F-measure.
Figure 3.2: Precision comparison chart between all features and selected features
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Figure 3.3: F-measure comparison chart between all features and selected features
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The two figures show for each classification method, that the performance com-
parison between 8 and 41 features is quite close. For J48 and PART methods, the
performance with 8 features is actually improved. Another advantage of selecting
features is the running time is shorter than using all features. We will show the
computation time comparison in section 3.3.2.
3.2 Modified Mutual Information-based Feature
Selection for Intrusion Detection Systems
First of all, the mutual information between each feature and class label in the KDD99
dataset is calculated. The results are shown in figure 3.4. Figure 3.4 shows that
feature 5 has the largest mutual information value. This means that feature 5 and
the class label have the largest correlation.
Figure 3.4: Mutual information of between each feature and class label in KDD99
dataset
We could rank the features by mutual information from figure 3.4. But we
could not select the features according to this way. Take features 5, 12 and 23 as
an example, let C represent class label and mutual information between the three
features and C are I( f5; C) = 0.6424, I( f12; C) = 0.381, I( f23; C) = 0.6179. In
descending order, the three are sorted as f5, f23, f12. But after f5 is selected, we
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should delete the correct instances induced by f5. Battiti proposed an evaluation
function considering the mutual information between features, which is shown by
formula 3.5, along with the method called mutual information-based feature selection
(MIFS). In this case, the mutual information between f5 and f23 is I( f5, f23) = 1.472
and the mutual information between f5 and f12 is I( f5, f12) = 0.5436. According to
Battiti’s evaluation function, f12 will be selected, rather than f23. In 2009, Huawen
Liu proposed a dynamic mutual information method called DMIFS. And DMIFS
improved MIFS in respect to some performance.
I( fi; C)− β
∑
fs∈S
I( fi; fs) (3.5)
In formula 3.5, fi represents each feature in a set and fs denotes a selected feature
in a selected feature set S. There is a parameter β and Battiti suggested it should be
between 0.5 and 1. But in our study, we think the parameter should be related to
mutual information between each feature and class label, rather than a fixed value.
So we put forward an improved algorithm named MMIFS as follows.
Algorithm 3.2.1: Modified Mutual Information based Feature Selection algo-
rithm
Input: A training dataset T = D(F, C)
Output: Selected features S
1 Initialize relative parameters: F← ’initial set of all features’, C← ’class labels’,
S = ; ;
2 For each feature fi ∈ F , compute the mutual information of the features with
the class labels I( fi; C) ;
3 Selection of the first feature: find the fi that maximizes the I( fi, C), then
S = S ∪ fi, F = F \ fi ;
4 while Desired number of selected features is not achieved do
5 Computation of the mutual information between features: for all pair of
features ( fi, fs), where fi ∈ F and fs ∈ S, compute I( fi; fs);
6 Selection of the next feature: choose the feature fi as the one that
maximizes I( fi; C)−
∑
fs∈S
I( fi; C) ∗ I( fi; fs);
7 return Selected features: S.
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3.3 Experimental Results
3.3.1 Implemented System
C4.5 is used to classify the feature set that was selected by applying MMIFS. C4.5
is an algorithm used to generate a decision tree developed by Ross Quinlan and it
is an extension of Quinlan’s earlier ID3 algorithm. The decision trees generated by
C4.5 can be used for classification, and for this reason, C4.5 is often referred to as
a statistical classifier. C4.5 uses the concept of information gain to make a tree of
classificatory decisions with respect to a previously chosen target classification. The
information gain can be described as the effective decrease in entropy resulting from
making a choice as to which attribute to use and at what level.
The classification is based on six measures: True Positive Rate (TPR), False
Positive Rate (FPR), Precision, Total Accuracy, Recall, F-Measure. The six measures
are calculated by True Positive (TP), False Positive (FP), True Negative (TN), False
Negative (FN), as follows.
True positive rate (TPR): TP/(TP+FN), also known as detection rate (DR) or
sensitivity or recall.
False positive rate (FPR): FP/(TN+FP) also known as the false alarm rate.
Precision (P): TP/(TP+FP) is defined as the proportion of the true positives
against all the positive results.
Total Accuracy (TA): (TP+TN)/(TP+TN+FP+FN) is the proportion of true results
(both true positives and true negatives) in the population.
Recall (R): TP/(TP+FN) is defined as percentage of positive labeled instances
that were predicted as positive.
F-measure: 2PR/(P+R) is the harmonic mean of precision and recall.
In our experiments, we need to determine the desired feature numbers which
we expect to select in KDD Cup 99 dataset. Thus, we calculated total accuracy of
different feature numbers which are obtained by MMIFS. The results are shown in
figure 3.5.
We can see from the figure that we tested 13 features obtained by MMIFS. The
reason we tested 13 features is that less or equal than 13 selected features of KDD
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Figure 3.5: Total accuracy of different feature numbers
99 dataset could achieve best performance and relatively less computation time
according to the feature selection algorithms we used before(e.g.CFS). The total
accuracy does not increase as the numbers rise. The reason is because there are
many noisy and redundant features in the dataset.
From figure 3.5, we can see that the total accuracy is between 93% and 94%
if we select 2 to 13 features. And the accuracy is very close for different feature
numbers. But considering the large number of instances in the KDD 99 dataset, a
small improvement in accuracy will result in many instances being correctly classified.
A range of features between 2 and 13 could be used for comparison. But when
we used DMIFS to get the features, we realised if the desired numbers are small,
most of the features are the same as we got by MMIFS. Thus, we choose 10 features
to compare the algorithms since the algorithm (DMIFS) which is compared with
MMIFS could achieve the best performance when it select 10 features.
3.3.2 Results
As we disscussed in section 2.3, intrusion detection can be considered as a two class
problem or a multiple class problem. In this experiment, we regard all attack types
as anomaly patterns and the other class is a normal pattern, addressing intrusion
detection as a two class problem.
In the following subsection, C4.5 is used to classify the dataset and compare the
performance between DMIFS and MMIFS. C4.5 is better than some other classification
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algorithms and comparison between C4.5 and 3 other algorithms by using 10 selected
features shows in table 3.1. From table 3.1, we can see that C4.5 is much better
than other 3 algorithms. Though some other methods could achieve the same or
even better performance than C4.5, such as SVM or neural network. But they take
longer computation time. The experiments were conducted on the KDD 99 dataset
and performed on a Windows machine having configuration and Intel (R) Core (TM)
i5-2400 CPU@ 3.10GHz, 3.10 GHz, 4GB of RAM, the operating system is Microsoft
Windows 7 Professional. We have used an open source machine learning framework
Weka 3.5.0. We have used this tool for performance comparison of our algorithm
with other classification algorithms. Table 3.2 shows the specific comparison and
it indicates that most of the performances are improved by MMIFS compared to
DMIFS and Battiti’s method, such as precision and F-measure. The experiment is
executed 10 times and the differences in performance of different methods are
statistically evaluated using paired t-test with two-tailed p = 0.01. MMIFS could
achieve statistically better result. The total accuracies for these three methods are
92.65%, 92.94% and 93.02% respectively.
Suppose there are m instances and n features in training dataset. The time
complexity of MMIFS, DMIFS and Battiti’s algorithms are O(mn2), O(mn2) and
O(mn) respectively.
From the comparison results, we can see that MMIFS could have better perfor-
mance than other two algorithms when they all select 10 features. The first two rows
show the performance of C4.5 with all 41 features. And the next four rows describe
results of Battiti’s method and DMIFS. They have the same results since they select
the same 10 features. MMIFS get the best performance although differences are not
very large.
Another advantage for applying feature selection methods on KDD 99 dataset is
the saving in computation time. In C4.5 algorithm, we need to build a model from
the KDD 99 training dataset first and then evaluate the model on the test dataset.
Figure 3.6 describes the time taken to build model comparison by the different
feature numbers. Feature selection algorithm is used on 10 percent KDD training
dataset first. Then we used 10 percent of KDD training dataset to create decision tree
model first and re-evaluated on test dataset. And some computation time is spend
for it. Figure 3.7 illustrates the total time comparison by different feature numbers.
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Table 3.1: Comparison Results between C4.5 and other 3 Algorithms
Algorithm TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F-Measure Class
C4.5
0.99 0.084 0.741 0.99 0.848 normal
0.916 0.01 0.997 0.916 0.955 anomaly
Naive Bayes
0.974 0.107 0.688 0.974 0.806 normal
0.893 0.026 0.993 0.893 0.94 anomaly
OneR
0.984 0.111 0.681 0.984 0.805 normal
0.889 0.016 0.996 0.889 0.939 anomaly
LogitBoost
0.976 0.093 0.718 0.976 0.828 normal
0.907 0.024 0.994 0.907 0.949 anomaly
Table 3.2: Comparison Results between DMIFS and MMIFS Algorithm
Algorithm TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F-Measure Class
C4.5
0.994 0.09 0.728 0.994 0.841 Normal
0.91 0.006 0.999 0.91 0.952 Anomaly
C4.5 with Battiti’s
0.993 0.086 0.736 0.993 0.846 normal
0.914 0.007 0.998 0.914 0.954 anomaly
C4.5 with DMIFS
0.993 0.086 0.736 0.993 0.846 normal
0.914 0.007 0.998 0.914 0.954 anomaly
C4.5 with MMIFS
0.99 0.084 0.741 0.99 0.848 normal
0.916 0.01 0.997 0.916 0.955 anomaly
Figure 3.6: Time taken to build model comparison chart
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Figure 3.7: Total time comparison chart
We can see from figure 3.6 and figure 3.7 that as the number of features increases,
the calculation time increases significantly. It indicates that the computation time is
greatly affected by the numbers of features.
3.4 Summary
This chapter proposed a new feature selection method and the main improvement of
this work is that it modifies the mutual information feature selection algorithm by
changing the weighting parameter. We tested this method on the KDD 99 dataset
and compared the results with the DMIFS algorithm. The results show that most of
the performance indicators are improved. Future work will evaluate the algorithm
against other datasets which have less noise and less redundant features. The value
of the weighting parameter may not be optimum, and so further study will attempt
to find values of the parameter that produce the best results. Finally, we will try to
compare the method based on correlation coefficient of features with the method
based on mutual information.
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Chapter 4
Feature Grouping for Intrusion
Detection based on Mutual
Information
F EATURE grouping is using the relationship of features in a dataset to composegroups and design selection strategy to select a feature or features from a
group[116]. We could take feature grouping as a kind of feature selection. In
particular, feature grouping that allows the selection of multiple features by one go
is applicable to the dataset with a high dimensionality.
In this chapter, two algorithms are proposed and they are both using feature
grouping method and based on mutual information. One is mutual information-based
feature grouping algorithm which is introduced in 4.1. The other one is feature
grouping by agglomerative hierarchical clustering based on mutual information,
which is presented in 4.2.
4.1 Mutual Information-based Feature Grouping
Method
4.1.1 Application to Feature Selection
As stated in 2.3, feature selection could help for classification task. For example,
Battiti’s work is based on mutual information to select features showed in 3.5.
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Formula 3.5 can be used to select the next feature. β is a parameter and de-
termined empirically and Battiti has proposed a value between 0.5 and 1 for β .
This algorithm indicates that feature selection should consider not only the mutual
information between each feature and class label but also the mutual information
between each feature and selected features.
If there are n features in the dataset and fi is the feature i, then Mi( fi; F) denotes
the mutual information between fi and all the other features. And it shows in formula
4.1.




I( fi; f j) (4.1)
When i=1,2,3,. . . ,n, SU MM I = [Mi( fi; F)] denotes the vector set of C .
Feature grouping could been seen as a kind of feature selection. We could measure
the relationship between one feature and other features by some methods. And then
we can use it to compose groups. Features who have similar metrics be put into will
in one group.
4.1.2 Selecting Strategy of Feature Grouping
Feature Grouping is highly beneficial in learning with high dimensional data. It
reduces the variance in the estimation and improves the stability of feature selection.
Furthermore, it could help in data understanding and interpretation as well. The
purpose of feature grouping is creating groups for candidate selecting features and
selecting one or more features from certain groups to represent the group.
Clustering methods could be used to create groups since they select data in one
cluster by specific metrics. Different clustering methods and metrics could compose
different cluster constructions. Number of clusters affects how many features will be
selected. For example, different strategies could be adopted if we expect to select
8 features from a dataset. We could create 8 groups by a clustering method and
select 1 feature in each group. Or we could construct 4 groups and select 2 features
per group instead. Figure 4.1 is shown one example of feature grouping strategy.
Moreover, we could select different numbers of features in different groups. For
example, hierarchical clustering method could be used to create groups in this work,
we chose the selecting 1 feature from each group strategy. This strategy is simple
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Figure 4.1: Selecting strategy example of feature grouping
and easy to implement. And another reason is there might be only one feature in
one group by using agglomerative hierarchical clustering method.
From figure 4.1 we can see there are n features F1, F2, ..., Fn. And they compose
m groups G1, G2, ..., Gm by using a specific method. Then in each group, we select
one feature and get selected features set Fs1, Fs2, ..., Fsm.
4.1.3 Feature Grouping based on Mutual Information Algorithm
Feature selection can be improved on through Feature Grouping based on Mutual
Information (FGMI) as follows.
From the algorithm 4.1.1, it can be seen that the number of features selected by
this algorithm depends on the number of groups. The mutual information between
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Algorithm 4.1.1: Feature Grouping based on Mutual Information
Input: A training dataset T = D(F, C), G
Output: Selected features S
1 Initialize parameters: F← ’initial set of all features’, C← ’class labels’, S =∅ ;
2 For each feature fi, calculate the mutual information between fi and all the
other features in F , then sum the results together and it can be calculated by
formula 4.1, and finally get a vector SU MM I ;
3 Use Fuzzy C Means algorithm on SU MM I to get G groups ;
4 For each group g in G, calculate mutual information between each feature and
class label in C , and then find the maximum value Mg in each group ;
5 Select feature fs which has the Mg in each group, and put fs into S, S←′ f s′ ;
6 Return the set containing the selected features: S.
each pair of features is calculated and Fuzzy C-Means algorithm is used to compose
the groups. Fuzzy C-Means (FCM) is a method of clustering which allows one piece
of data to belong to two or more clusters. This method (developed by Dunn in 1973
and improved by Bezdek in 1981) is frequently used in pattern recognition and
unsupervised classification.
At first, the proposed algorithm calculates the mutual information between each
feature and all the other features and adds them together, denoted as SU MM I . Then,
it ranked the SU MM I by Fuzzy C-Means algorithm to get G groups. Moreover, in each
group, the algorithm computes mutual information between each feature and class
label and get the maximum one. At last, select the feature which has the maximum
value.
From the process of FGMI, we can see that G decides how many features will be
selected by this algorithm. FGMI composes G groups and selects one feature from
each group. In other words, the algorithm will select G features. FGMI requires users
to input G at first as FGMI does not attempt to decide how many features should
be selected by itself. Someone might argue this is a disadvantage of the algorithm,
but FGMI is very efficient in computation time. The reason is that algorithms
that automatically calculate the optimum number of selected features need to add
performance evaluation or deduce part in the algorithms. However, FGMI would be
able to use performance evaluation of selected features to find the best G. FGMI is
appropriate for datasets who have large number of instance such as KDD 99.
To compose groups, we could use many methods, such as divide SU MM I into
G groups on average. But after ranked SU MM I , we realised data in SU MM I is
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unbalanced and nearly half of the values are quite low. So we chose to use clustering
algorithm to compose groups. Fuzzy C-Means is used to compose G groups in
FGMI. This algorithm could divide a set X = {x1, x2, ..., xn} into C clusters and make
objective function get minimum value. Data are bound to each cluster by means
of a Membership Function, which represents the fuzzy behaviour of this algorithm.
Data in SU MM I are one-dimensional and unbalanced. After using Fuzzy C-Means on
SU MM I , most low values in SU MM I will go into one group. In contrast, high values
in SU MM I will go into different groups.
4.2 Feature Grouping by Agglomerative Hierarchical
Clustering based on Mutual Information
In this section, feature grouping by agglomerative hierarchical clustering based on
mutual information(FGMI-AHC) is described in detail. The basic idea is grouping the
features by agglomerative hierarchical clustering method, and then selecting features
from the groups. As we used a clustering method to construct groups, cluster and
group have the same meaning in the following formulation.
4.2.1 Hierarchical Clustering
Hierarchical clustering is a clustering method to build a hierarchy of clusters[61].
There are two types of strategies for hierarchical clustering, agglomerative and
divisive[138]. Agglomerative is a bottom-up approach where initially every data
item constitutes its own cluster, and pairs of clusters are merged as one moves up the
hierarchy[31, 85]. Divisive is a top-down approach and all data is part of the initial
cluster and splits are performed recursively as one moves down the hierarchy[142].
In order to decide which clusters should be combined or split, a measure of
dissimilarity between sets of observations is required. In most methods of hierarchical
clustering, this is achieved by use of an appropriate metric and a linkage criterion.
In this chapter, an agglomerative hierarchical clustering algorithm is used based on
linkage rule. The rule means different distance metrics and methods which could be
used in linkage. Take the test on KDD 99 for example, figure 4.2 shows dendrogram
of agglomerative hierarchical clustering on KDD99 by median distance. Different
metric will results in different dendrogram. Figure 4.3 describes dendrogram of
agglomerative hierarchical clustering on KDD99 by inner squared distance.
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Figure 4.2: Dendrogram of agglomerative hierarchical clustering on KDD99 by
median distance
Figure 4.3: Dendrogram of agglomerative hierarchical clustering on KDD99 by inner
squared distance
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There are some methods for computing distance between clusters, such as average,
centroid, complete, median, single, ward, weighted and so on. Different method will
result in different cluster tree, such as figure 4.2 and figure 4.3.
4.2.2 Implemented Algorithm
In this section, we will show the algorithm put forward by this chapter. The detailed
algorithm is shown as follows.
Algorithm 4.2.1: Feature Grouping based on Agglomerative Hierarchical
Clustering Algorithm
Input: A training dataset T = D(F, C), number of clusters n.
Output: Selected features S
1 Initialize parameters: F← ’initial set of all features’, C← ’class labels’, S =∅ ;
2 Calculate the mutual information of every pair of features fi and f j in F ,
denote as I( fi; f j);
3 Create hierarchical cluster tree by using agglomerative hierarchical clustering
method base on I( fi; f j) ;
4 Construct clusters from a hierarchical cluster tree by given n ;
5 For each cluster, calculate mutual information between each feature and class
label in C , and then find the maximum value Mc ;
6 Select feature fs which has the Mc in each group, and put fs into S, S←′ f ′s ;
7 Return selected features: S.
First of all, the algorithm decides initialization parameters and F is a set of all
the features in the training dataset. And C denotes class labels and n represents
clusters number. Then, the algorithm calculates the mutual information of every
pair of features in F and composes a matrix based on them. After that, it creates a
hierarchical cluster tree based on the matrix by using an agglomerative hierarchical
clustering method. Moreover, it constructs clusters from a hierarchical cluster tree by
given n. And n clusters mean n groups containing candidate features. Furthermore,
in each cluster, it calculates mutual information between each feature and class label
in C , and then finds the maximum value Mc. Finally, it selects feature fs which has
the Mc in each group, and put fs into S.
There are some distances could be used to compute between pairs of objects data
when we using AHC. Such as Euclidean, chebychev,cosine, correlation, hamming and
so on. In this algorithm, we take mutual information between each pair of features as
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their distance. Thus some of methods for computing distance between clusters could
not be used since they are appropriate for Euclidean distances only. That means
centroid, median and and ward could not be used in this algorithm. And complete
and single mean furthest and shortest distance respectively. In this algorithm, we use
average menthod which means unweighted average distance. The reason is average
method is least affected by abnormal data.
As stated in 4.1.3, this algorithm also requires users to input number of clusters n
first. And we select one feature from each cluster. It means the number of clusters is
equal to the number of features you will select. This algorithm constructs a maximum
of n clusters and finds the smallest height at which horizontal cut through the tree
leaves n or fewer clusters.
4.3 Experimental Evaluation - Comparison with
Other Approaches
4.3.1 Results by FGMI
As described in the section 4.1.3, the number of features obtained from the algorithm
depends on the number of groups. Fuzzy C Means algorithm is used to divide the
ranked vector SU MM I . From our previous work in this area, we tested some feature
selection algorithm on KDD 99 dataset,such as CFS. If features are selected between 8
and 14, it could achieve better performance on KDD 99 dataset, and the performance
evaluations are as follows.
C4.5 algorithm is used to classify the dataset. The classification performances
are usually denoted by six measures which are presented in 3.3.1 specifically. In
this section, we will use these measures to evaluate the algorithms’ performance.
Figure 4.4 shows the TPR comparison by different number of features. Figure 4.5
describes the FPR comparison by different number of features. Figure 4.6 illustrates
the precision comparison by different number of features. Total Accuracy and F-
Measure comparison chart by different number of selected features are shown in
figure 4.7 and figure 4.8 respectively.
The experiment is executed 10 times and the differences in performance of
different methods are statistically evaluated using paired t-test with two-tailed p
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Figure 4.4: True positive rate comparison chart by different number of selected
features
Figure 4.5: False positive rate comparison chart by different number of selected
features
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Figure 4.6: Precision comparison chart by different number of selected features
Figure 4.7: Total Accuracy comparison chart by different number of selected features
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Figure 4.8: F-measure comparison chart by different number of selected features
= 0.01. Table 4.1 shows the comparison with DMIFS and FGMI on average. The
first row is shown that C4.5 with all 41 features in the dataset. The second row
represented DMIFS algorithm proposed by Huawen. 13 features are used by DMIFS
and the performance is shown in row 2. The last two rows describe the results of
the proposed algorithm FGMI. 13 features and 10 features are used to test by C4.5
respectively. And it is shown from the results that the proposed algorithm could
improve the performance of all the measures. Table 4.1 highlighted in bold indicates
statistically superior results in comparison to the rest.
Table 4.1: Comparison Results Between DMIFS and FGMI
Algorithm TP Rate FP Rate Precision F-Measure Class
C4.5
0.994 0.09 0.728 0.841 Normal
0.91 0.006 0.999 0.952 Anomaly
C4.5 + DMIFS (13)
0.993 0.086 0.736 0.846 normal
0.914 0.007 0.998 0.954 anomaly
C4.5 + FGMI (13)
0.994 0.085 0.739 0.848 normal
0.915 0.006 0.998 0.955 anomaly
C4.5 + FGMI (10)
0.994 0.082 0.746 0.852 normal
0.918 0.006 0.998 0.957 anomaly
Another 3 algorithms were used to compare beside C4.5, and table 4.2 shows
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the comparisons by the 3 different classification algorithms. The comparisons are
between 41 features and 10 features which are got from the proposed algorithm.
The results show that the proposed algorithm could achieve better performance,
especially on F-Measure.
Table 4.2: Comparison Results by Different Classification Algorithms
Algorithm TP Rate FP Rate Precision F-Measure Class
PART
0.994 0.087 0.733 0.844 Normal
0.913 0.006 0.999 0.954 Anomaly
PART (10)
0.982 0.076 0.757 0.855 normal
0.924 0.018 0.995 0.958 anomaly
Bayes
0.976 0.1 0.702 0.817 normal
0.9 0.024 0.994 0.944 anomaly
Bayes (10)
0.979 0.1 0.702 0.818 normal
0.9 0.021 0.994 0.945 anomaly
JRip
0.994 0.087 0.734 0.845 Normal
0.913 0.006 0.998 0.954 Anomaly
JRip (10)
0.982 0.086 0.733 0.84 Normal
0.914 0.018 0.995 0.953 Anomaly
One of the advantages of the feature selection method using on KDD 99 dataset
is saving computation time. More features means more computation time. Figure
4.9 shows the time taken to build model of C4.5 algorithm by different number of
features.
4.3.2 Results by FGMI-AHC
Table 4.3 shows comparison results by different feature selection methods using 13
selected features. The first algorithm C4.5 used 41 features to do the classification.
DMIFS is dynamic mutual information feature selection method proposed by Huawen
Liu, and it is introduced in chapter 3 in detailed. FGMI and FGMI-AHC are presented
in section 4.1.3 and 4.2 respectively. We can see from the comparison that FGMI-AHC
algorithm produces better performance on F-measure and achieves good performance
on other measures.
Table 4.4 describes comparison results by different feature selection methods
using 10 selected features. C4.5, DMIFS, FGMI and FGMI-AHC have the meaning as
table 4.3. MMIFS is modified mutual information feature selection method raised by
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Figure 4.9: Time taken to build model comparison chart by different number of
features
Table 4.3: Comparison results by different algorithms using 13 selected features
Algorithm TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F-Measure Class
C4.5(41)
0.994 0.09 0.728 0.994 0.841 Normal
0.91 0.006 0.999 0.91 0.952 Anomaly
DMIFS
0.993 0.086 0.736 0.993 0.846 normal
0.914 0.007 0.998 0.914 0.954 anomaly
FGMI
0.994 0.085 0.739 0.994 0.848 normal
0.915 0.006 0.998 0.915 0.955 anomaly
FGMI-AHC
0.993 0.077 0.757 0.993 0.849 normal
0.923 0.007 0.998 0.923 0.959 anomaly
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Jingping in 2014. And we can see from the comparison that FGMI-AHC could get
better performance nearly in all measures. The paired t-test is again employed to
compare the differences between C4.5, DMIFS, FGMI against FGMI-AHC. The tables
highlighted in bold indicate statistically superior results in comparison to the rest.
Table 4.4: Comparison results by different algorithms using 10 selected features
Algorithm TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F-Measure Class
C4.5(41)
0.994 0.09 0.728 0.994 0.841 Normal
0.91 0.006 0.999 0.91 0.952 Anomaly
DMIFS
0.99 0.084 0.741 0.99 0.848 normal
0.916 0.01 0.997 0.916 0.955 anomaly
MMIFS
0.993 0.086 0.736 0.993 0.846 normal
0.914 0.007 0.998 0.914 0.954 anomaly
FGMI
0.994 0.082 0.746 0.994 0.852 normal
0.918 0.006 0.998 0.918 0.957 anomaly
FGMI-AHC
0.994 0.08 0.751 0.994 0.856 normal
0.92 0.006 0.998 0.92 0.958 anomaly
The purpose of comparison in table 4.3 and table 4.4 is to compare FGMI-AHC
and other algorithms by the same number of selected features. Figure 4.10 illustrates
the precision comparison of FGMI-AHC by different number of features.
Figure 4.11 and figure 4.12 show the F-measure and total accuracy comparison
of FGMI-AHC by different number of features respectively.
From the comparison of figure 4.10 to figure 4.12, we could see better perfor-
mance could be achieved when selecting 12 features by FGMI-AHC. And table 4.5
shows detailed comparison of FGMI-AHC by different number of selected features.
We can see from table 4.5 that FGMI-AHC algorithm could get best performance
by selecting 12 features. And for F-measure, both normal and anomaly could achieve
highest value when using 12 selected features.
Suppose there are m instances and n features in training dataset. Both of time
complexity of FGMI and FGMI-AHC are O(mn2).
From the experimental results, we can see that FGMI and FGMI-AHC could get
better performance but most values are close to other algorithms. On one hand,
the reason is KDD 99 dataset has large number of instance, smalll improvements of
68
4.3. Experimental Evaluation - Comparison with Other Approaches
Figure 4.10: Precision comparison of FGMI-AHC by different number of selected
features
Figure 4.11: F-measure comparison of FGMI-AHC by different number of selected
features
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Figure 4.12: Total accuracy comparison of FGMI-AHC by different number of selected
features
Table 4.5: Comparison results of FGMI-AHC by different number of selected features
No. of
Features TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F-Measure Class
8
0.995 0.082 0.745 0.995 0.852 Normal
0.918 0.005 0.999 0.918 0.956 Anomaly
9
0.995 0.082 0.745 0.995 0.852 Normal
0.918 0.005 0.999 0.918 0.956 Anomaly
10
0.994 0.08 0.751 0.994 0.856 normal
0.92 0.006 0.998 0.92 0.958 anomaly
11
0.995 0.091 0.726 0.995 0.839 Normal
0.909 0.005 0.999 0.909 0.952 Anomaly
12
0.994 0.075 0.762 0.994 0.863 normal
0.925 0.006 0.998 0.925 0.96 anomaly
13
0.993 0.077 0.757 0.993 0.859 normal
0.923 0.007 0.998 0.923 0.959 anomaly
14
0.994 0.087 0.734 0.994 0.844 normal
0.913 0.006 0.998 0.913 0.954 anomaly
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performance will bring large number of instances changed. On the other hand, the
two algorithms we performed both select features first by a given number, rather than
deduce to find the best feature number. Thus, we could only see the performance
after feature selection process.
4.4 Summary
Section 4.2 has presented a feature grouping method based on agglomerative hier-
archical clustering method. It described how to compose the group by hierarchical
tree, how to get the number of groups and how to select features in each group. First
of all, the mutual information between each pair of two features is calculated to be
used to construct the hierarchical tree. Moreover, the proposed algorithm creates
groups by a given number. Finally, the mutual information between a feature and
class labels is used to select one feature in one group. Experiment results on KDD 99
dataset indicate that the proposed approach generally outperforms DMIFS, MMIFS,
and FGMI algorithm. Furthermore, the comparison by different number of features
shows that 12 features could get best performance indicator.
Whilst promising, the presented work opens avenues for further investigation.
For instance, the mutual information between features and class labels can be used
to design new algorithm. And other clustering or classification algorithms can be
applied to compose groups. Moreover, more than one feature could be selected in
a certain group. In future work, the proposed algorithm will be tested on other





Online Streaming Feature Selection
for IDS
I N this chapter, online streaming feature selection algorithm is proposed and it isapplied to the KDD99 dataset. Traditional feature selection algorithms usually
need a high level of computational effort and we need to input all features at the same
time and then carry out the learning process. It will consume more memory space
if the dataset has more features. Online feature selection method could integrate
new features as they arrive and carry out the computation. Specifically, the goal
of online streaming feature selection is to develop online classifiers that involve
only a small and fixed number of features for classification. This method is fit for
applications where not all features could be present in advance or the feature volumns
are unknown or of infinite size.
Online streaming feature selection is fit to deal with sequential training data of
high dimensionality such as online intrusion detection system[32, 182]. The major
contribution of this chapter is that I proposed a novel algorithm to solve real-world
problems in intrusion detection system. And this online streaming feature selection
algorithm could apply on other datasets as well. The application of online streaming
feature selection algorithm to other datasets will be specifically described in chapter
7.
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5.1 Framework for Feature Selection with Streaming
Feature
Unlike the existing studies on feature selection, online streaming feature selection
aims to solve the feature selection problem by online learning approach. Streaming
features are features in dataset which flow one by one over time without changing
the number of training samples. Compare to traditional feature selection algorithms,
there are two advantages of streaming features. One is feature dimensions could
grow over time and extend to an infinite size. Another one is features can be read
one by one and each feature is processed online upon its arrival.
Algorithm 5.1.1 describes the framework of online feature selection algorithm. T
is a training dataset and D(F, C) denotes the dataset composed by all features set F
and class label C . Output BC F is abbreviation of Best Candidate Feature. At first,
streaming in a new feature f . And then, if f relevant to class label C , add f to BC F .
Otherwise, discard f . Furthermore, judge whether f in BC F is redundant. If yes,
remove it. At last, BC F will be returned.
Algorithm 5.1.1: Online Streaming Feature Selection
Input: A training dataset T = D(F, C)
Output: Best Candidate Feature set BC F
1 Initialize BCF = {};
2 Stream in a new feature f ;
3 if f is relevant to C then
4 Add f to BCF;
5 else
6 Discard f ;
7 if f is redundant in BCF then
8 Remove f from BCF;
9 return the set containing selected features: BC F .
Xidong’s work is based on this framework and proposed OSFS and fast OSFS[182].
And he presented his own method to distinguish irrelevant and redundant features. As
stated in 3.1.2, he defined strong relevant, weakly relevant, irrelevant and redundant
features. These definition are based on the changes of objective function when
streaming a feature. The advantage of this method is that it performs well but
it takes time to deduce in feature selection progress. In other words, optimizing
objective the function occupies a long time.
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5.2 Online Streaming Feature Selection Algorithm
Based on the framework of online feature selection algorithm in 5.1, we proposed
two online feature selection algorithms. One of them shows in algorithm 5.2.1.
Input is training dataset and output is BC F . This algorithm needs user to input two
parameters, relevance threshold r and mutual information threshold mi. The reason
is the algorithm uses relevance and mutual information to analyse the relevance
and redundancy of the streaming feature. After streaming in a new feature f , the
algorithm will judge whether the relevance between f and class label C is larger
than r. If yes, the feature f will be added to BC F . The redundancy analysis is based
on mutual information. If the mean mutual information between f and all the other
features in BC F is larger then mi, the feature will be discarded.
The advantage of this algorithm is computation time will be saved and the
analysis of relevance and redundancy are easier to implement. But the weakness of
this algorithm is users need to understand the relevance and mutual information
between the features in dataset and class label or features. Otherwise, users could
not give a reasonable value to r and mi.
Algorithm 5.2.1: Online Streaming Feature Selection Algorithm 1
Input: A training dataset T = D(F, C), r, mi
Output: Best Candidate Feature set BC F
1 BC F = {};
2 Input relevance threshold r;
3 Input mutual information threshold mi;
4 while The total number of features in T is not reached do
5 added = 0;
6 f ← get_new_ f eature();
7 if (Relevance( f , C)> r) then
8 added = 1;
9 BC F = BC F
⋃
f ;
10 if (added) then
11 if (
∑
fi∈(BC F− f )
Mutual_In f ormation( f , fi)> mi) then
12 BC F = BC F − f ;
13 Output BC F .
The process of feature selection in this algorithm is only based on the relationship
of features and class labels and there is no objective function. The relationships we
used in this algorithm are relevance and mutual information.
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Another algorithm is shown in algorithm 5.2.2. At first, the first feature will
added to BC F , and users need to input a desired number K of features to be selected.
If the length of BC F is smaller than K , the streaming feature is added to BC F . Else it
will calculate mean relevance between all features in BC F and class label. S denotes
the number of features in BC F . Then, the redundancy analysis is calculated by
redundanc y = 1S ∗M I( f , C)
∑
f j∈S
M I( f , f j). And this formula means it calculates
mean mutual information between streaming feature f and all the other features in
BC F , and it is weighted by mutual information between f and class label C .
Algorithm 5.2.2: Online Streaming Feature Selection Algorithm 2
Input: A training dataset T = D(F, C), K
Output: Best Candidate Feature set BC F
1 BC F = {};
2 BC F ← get_ f irst_ f eature();
3 K ← Input_Desired_FeatureNo;
4 while The total number of features in T is not reached do
5 f ← get_new_ f eature();
6 if leng th(BC F)< K then




9 BC F = BC F
⋃
f ;




11 redundanc y = 1S ∗M I( f , C)
∑
f j∈S
M I( f , f j)
12 cri terion= relevance− redundanc y
13 if criterion < (criterion|BCF - f) then
14 BC F = BC F − f
15 Output BC F .
Compared to algorithm 5.2.1, this algorithm need not to input thresholds before
it starts. It takes relevance and redundancy as a criterion and uses it to judge
whether to select a streaming feature or not. And criterion idea is taken from
[148] and we improved it. The improvement is the method of calculating relevance
and redundancy. The relevance here is decided by the relevance between feature
and class labels. And redundancy is calculated by mutual information, denoted as
redundanc y = 1S ∗M I( f , C)
∑
f j∈S
M I( f , f j).
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5.3 Experimental Evaluation - Comparison with
Traditional Feature Selection algorithms
In the following subsection, C4.5 is used to classify the dataset and compare the
performance between OSFS and other algorithms proposed in other chapters. The ex-
periments were conducted by using the KDD 99 dataset and performed on a Windows
machine having configuration and Intel (R) Core (TM) i5-4308U CPU@ 2.8GHz,
2.8 GHz, 8GB of RAM, the operating system is Microsoft Windows 7 Professional.
We have used an open source machine learning framework Weka 3.6.0. We have
used this tool for performance comparison of our algorithm with other classification
algorithms.
5.3.1 Results of OSFS1
Statistical paired t-test (per fold) is carried out to justify the significance of differences
in performance of different methods, with threshold p = 0.01. The experiment is
executed 10 times and table 5.1 shows the performance comparison of OSFS1 and
DMIFS and FGMI on average. The table highlighted in bold indicates statistically
superior results in comparison to the rest. We use OSFS1 to select 15 features and
we could see from the comparison that OSFS1 could have the best performance.
Table 5.1: Comparison Results Between OSFS1 and DMIFS and FGMI
Algorithm TP Rate FP Rate Precision F-Measure Class
C4.5
0.994 0.09 0.728 0.841 Normal
0.91 0.006 0.999 0.952 Anomaly
C4.5 + DMIFS (13)
0.993 0.086 0.736 0.846 normal
0.914 0.007 0.998 0.954 anomaly
C4.5 + FGMI (13)
0.994 0.085 0.739 0.848 normal
0.915 0.006 0.998 0.955 anomaly
C4.5 + OSFS1 (15)
0.994 0.083 0.743 0.85 normal
0.917 0.006 0.998 0.956 anomaly
In this algorithm, the number of selected features is decided by the input thresh-
olds r and mi. Regarding this experiment, we set r = 0.2 and mi = 0.05. The two
values could be decided by experience or understanding of the dataset or according
to the largest relevance and mutual information between features and class labels.
The number of selected features will be changed if you change the input value r and
mi.
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5.3.2 Performance evaluation of OSFS2
We need to select some features to do the performance comparison for algorithm
OSFS2 since the algorithm requires to input a number that user want to select the
feature number. As stated in 4.3.1, we select 8 to 14 features to do performance
evaluation. Figure 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5 show true positive rate, false positive
rate, precision, F_Measure and accuracy comparison by different number of selected
features respectively. From the comparison we could see that we could get best
performance when we select 9 features by using algorithm OSFS2. Table 5.2 describes
comparison of OSFS2 and other algorithms using 10 features. And from the table,
we could see that OSFS2 could achieve better performance, especially F-Measure.
The paired t-test is again employed to compare the differences in performance of
different methods. The table highlighted in bold indicates statistically superior results
in comparison to the rest.
Figure 5.1: True positive rate comparison chart by different number of selected
features
Algorithm OSFS2 will vary depending on the order in which features are streamed.
The results in table 5.2 used the original order of the dataset. Next, we change the
order of streaming feature randomly and get its performance. In this test, we did this
experiment 10 times and selected 9 features every time. The average performance
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Figure 5.2: False positive rate comparison chart by different number of selected
features
Figure 5.3: Precision comparison chart by different number of selected features
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Figure 5.4: F_Measure comparison chart by different number of selected features
Figure 5.5: Accuracy comparison chart by different number of selected features
80
5.4. Summary
Table 5.2: Comparison Results Between OSFS2 and other algorithms
Algorithm TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F-Measure Class
C4.5(41)
0.994 0.09 0.728 0.994 0.841 Normal
0.91 0.006 0.999 0.91 0.952 Anomaly
DMIFS(10)
0.99 0.084 0.741 0.99 0.848 normal
0.916 0.01 0.997 0.916 0.955 anomaly
MMIFS(10)
0.993 0.086 0.736 0.993 0.846 normal
0.914 0.007 0.998 0.914 0.954 anomaly
FGMI(10)
0.994 0.082 0.746 0.994 0.852 normal
0.918 0.006 0.998 0.918 0.957 anomaly
FGMI-AHC(10)
0.994 0.08 0.751 0.994 0.856 normal
0.92 0.006 0.998 0.92 0.958 anomaly
C4.5 + OSFS2 (9)
0.993 0.079 0.753 0.993 0.856 normal
0.921 0.007 0.998 0.921 0.958 anomaly
of this 10 test is shown in table 5.3. And precision and F-measure are shown in
figure 5.6 and figure 5.7. From the test, we can see that streaming order affects
performance of results. And we also found that we could get better performance if
we stream features which have larger relevance with class labels.
Table 5.3: Average performance of different feature steaming order
TP Rate FP Rate Precision F-Measure Class
0.988 0.088 0.732 0.841 Normal
0.912 0.012 0.997 0.953 Anomaly
Suppose there are m instances and n features in training dataset. The time
complexity of OSFS1 and OSFS2 are O(mn) and O(mn2) respectively.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, I introduced two online feature selection algorithms. And from the
comparison with other feature selection algorithm we proposed before, we could see
that OSFS algorithms could get better performance. But there are some disadvantages
in the two algorithms, such as we need to input some threshold or desired number
of features you will select from datasets. And they need to be improved by revising
some part of the algorithms. Such as we might deeply analyse the relationship of
relevance and redundancy of features in a dataset and design an algorithm that
removes the need for any threshold or desired number.
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Figure 5.6: Precision of different feature streaming order test





M OST current network intrusion detection systems employ signature-based meth-ods or data mining-based methods which rely on labelled training data[187,
49]. This training data is typically expensive to produce. Moreover, these meth-
ods have diffculty in detecting new types of attack[162, 21]. Using unsupervised
anomaly detection techniques, however, the system can be trained with unlabelled
data and is capable of detecting previously unseen attacks[27]. In this chapter, two
algorithms are proposed. Cascading fuzzy C means clustering and C4.5 decision
tree classification algorithm combine an unsupervised method with a supervised
method. Cluster accumulation ensemble with hierarchical clustering algorithm is an
unsupervised algorithm. Both of them are evaluated on KDD 99 dataset.
6.1 Cascading Fuzzy C Means Clustering and C4.5
Decision Tree Classification Algorithm
We implemented a scheme to find anomaly instances using fuzzy C means clustering
and C4.5 decision tree algorithm. We regard all the attack instances as anomaly
instances and so convert a multiple class classification problem to a binary class
classification. Figure 6.1 shows the flow chart of proposed scheme. First of all, we
use feature selection methods on training data to get some selected features. But
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the features have different kinds of data structure. For this reason, we normalize
the data so that all attribute values are between 0 and 1. Then, we use fuzzy C-
means method to divide the training data into two clusters and get two centres.
As presented in 4.1.3, fuzzy C-means is a clustering method by using membership
function. Moreover, we calculate the membership function between each test data
instance and each cluster. The test data instance is allocated to the cluster which has
higher membership. Finally, fuzzy c-means is cascaded with the C4.5 by building
decision trees using the instances in each cluster. We used C4.5 algorithm to classify
the test data as an anomaly or a normal instance. Cascading could solve a problem
when most of instances from one class and very few instances from other classes
are in a single cluster. Such clusters, which are dominated by a single class, show
weak association to other classes. In KDD 99 dataset, most of the instances are DOS
attacks, and cascading two machine learning methods could get better results. Each
part of the process is now described in greater detail.
6.1.1 Application to Feature Selection
Table 6.1 shows four feature selection tests on KDD99 training dataset and we select
6 to 8 features. The results show that most of the features selected by different
feature selection methods are the same. Such as, all 6 features in test 3 are in the
results of test 1 and six features in the result of test 4 are in test 1 results. We used
the 8 features selected by test 1. They are protocol_type, service, flag, src_bytes,
dst_bytes, count, diff_srv_rate, dst_host_same_src_port_rate. The evaluator in test 1
is based on Correlation-based Feature Selection, which is one of the most well-known
and used filters, and ranks feature subsets according to a correlation based heuristic
evaluation function. And one advantage of feature selection is gaining speed.
Table 6.1: Results obtained by four feature selection methods over KDD99 training
dataset
Test Search Attribute No. of
No. Method Evaluator Selected Features
1 BestFirst CfsSubsetEval 8
2 Ranker ConsistencySubsetEval 7
3 FCBFSearch SymmetricalUncertAttributeSetEval 6
4 Randomsearch AttributeSubsetEvaluator 7
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Figure 6.1: Flow chart of proposed scheme
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6.1.2 Normalization
The 8 features we used have two types. The protocol_type, service, flag are symbolic
and the other five features are continuous. The protocol_type has 3 values, service
has 66 values, and flag has 11 values. Table 6.2 shows the minimum and maximum
value of each feature, as well as its mean, standard deviation and the number of
distinct examples of the five continuous features.
Table 6.2: Unbalanced continuous features of KDD Cup 99 dataset
Feature Max. Min. Mean StdDev Distinct
src_bytes 693375640 0 3025.61 988218.1 3300
dst_bytes 5155468 0 868.5324 33040 10725
count 511 0 332.2857 213.1474 490
diff_srv_rate 1 0 0.020982 0.082205 78
dst_host_same_src_port_rate 1 0 0.601935 0.481309 101
Normalization converts all the data in the dataset between 0 and 1. For a
particular continuous data x i, normalization follows equation 6.1,
Normalized(x i) = (x i − Xmin)/(Xmax − Xmin) (6.1)
where Xmin is the minimum value for variable X, Xmax is the maximum value for
variable X. For a specific symbolic feature, we assigned a discrete integer to each
value and then used equation 6.1 to normalize it.
6.1.3 Implemented Algorithm
In this section, we will show the algorithm of the fuzzy C means clustering cascade
with C4.5 decision tree classification methods for supervised anomaly detection.
Fuzzy C means allocate data points to clusters is not “hard” (all-or-nothing) but
“fuzzy” in the same sense as fuzzy logic. C4.5 is a well-known classification algorithm
used to generate a decision tree. We use fuzzy C means algorithm to group 2 clusters
and we get 2 centers. We then used C4.5 to classify in each cluster. Algorithm 6.1.1
is shown as follows.
At first, the algorithm initialise U which denotes the membership matrix of Dt rain,
in other words, sets U (0) to U . And Ui j is degree of membership of x i in cluster
j. x i is the ith of instance and c j is the jth center of cluster. Then, it uses fuzzy
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Algorithm 6.1.1: Cascading Fuzzy C Means clustering and C4.5 decision tree
classification algorithm
Input: Dt rain, Dtest(zi ∈ Dtest)
Output: Classified test instance zi to normal or anomaly
1 Initialise membership matrix of Dt rain, U = [ui j]← U (0)
2 while ||U (k+1) − U (k)|| ≥ ε do
3 Calculate the centres C1,C2;
4 Update U (k), U (k+1);
5 for zi ∈ Dtest do
6 Compute ui j, j = 1,2;
7 Find Higher Membership to zi;
8 Assign zi to Higher Membership Cluster;
9 Classify each cluster by C4.5;
10 Return C1, C2 and clusters.
c-means algorithm to calculate centers and membership matrix. And c j could be
calculated by 6.2, where m is any real number greater than 1. Membership matrix is
calculated by 6.3, where k are the iteration steps and the iteration will stop when
||U (k+1)−U (k)|| ≥ ε, whereas ε is a termination criterion between 0 and 1. In this case,
there are two centers C1 and C2. Furthermore, for each instance in test dataset Dtest ,
calculate membership value to each center. After that, it finds higher membership
and assigns the instance to higher membership cluster. In other words, the instance
in test dataset will divided into two clusters according to the degree of membership





















This algorithm has a limitation that users need to predefine the number of clusters.
In this case, all attacks are seen as abnormal data and there are two clusters, normal
and anomaly. Clusters could show internal structure of data and could help to find
unknown attacks. But for multi-class scenario, if users do not know the number of
attcks in test dataset, the algorithm lose effectiveness.
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6.2 New Evidence Accumulation Clustering with
Hierarchical Clustering Algorithm
Evidence accumulation clustering method combine the results of multiple clusterings
into a single data partition, by viewing each clustering result as an independent evi-
dence of data organization. It is can be presented as follows. Let X = {x1, x2, ..., xN}
be a dataset and E = {E1, E2, ..., EM} be M ensemble members. For X, each ensemble
returns a set of clusters Em = {Cm1 , C
m
2 , ..., C
m
Km
}, where Km is the number of clusters




k = X , and {C1, C2, ..., Cn} =
⋃M
m=1 EM denotes that the
Figure 6.2: Example of Cluster Ensemble
clusters generated by all ensemble members together form a set of base clusters for
ensemble, where n =
∑M
m=1 Km. There are two procedures of cluster ensemble. First,
ensemble members are generated. Second, a consensus function is then applied on
those ensemble members to generate the final clustering result.
Most evidence accumulation clustering algorithms use all features in dataset to
do clustering. And it usually costs large computation time on clustering if it is tested
on a large dataset. We proposed a new algorithm and it will cluster by each feature
rather than all the features in the same time. Figure 6.3 shows schematic diagram of
the proposed method. F1, F2, ...FM denote M features in dataset X and each Em is
calculated according to Fm. That means the number of ensembles is the number of
features in dataset X . And the algorithm is shown in algorithm 6.2.1.
From the algorithm description, we can see that it deals with features of the
dataset one by one. In other words, it clusters features one by one rather than
clustering all features at the same time. At first, the algorithm gets the instance
number and feature number to n and d and sets co_assoc to a null n× n matrix.
Co_assoc denotes co_association matrix. Then, it gets a feature from the dataset and
88
6.2. New Evidence Accumulation Clustering with Hierarchical Clustering Algorithm
Figure 6.3: Schematic diagram of the proposed method
Algorithm 6.2.1: New Evidence Accumulation Clustering Algorithm
Input: A training dataset T = D(F, C)
Output: Combined data partition E
1 n← Get instance number of dataset T ;
2 d ← Get feature number of dataset T ;
3 Set co_assoc to a null n× n matrix;
4 for i = 1 to d do
5 data_column← Get the i th feature from dataset T ;
6 Run clustering algorithm on data_column and produce a partition Ei;
7 Update the co_association matrix: for each pattern pair (i, j) in the same
cluster in Ei, set co_assoc(i, j) = co_assoc(i, j) + 1/d ;
8 Compute the SL dendrogram of co_assoc and identify the final patition E as
the ones with the highest lifetime;
9 return Combined data partition E.
runs the clustering algorithm on this feature and produce a patition. Moreover, it
updates the co_association matrix. For each pattern pair (i, j) in the same cluster in
Ei, set co_assoc(i, j) = co_assoc(i, j) + 1/d. The number of clustering is d. Finally,
we use hierarchical clustering algorithm with single link to get the final partition.
As stated above, the number of ensembles is fixed as the number of features if
a dataset is given. And the cluster generation process only use one feature rather
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than all features in dataset. Thus, computation time will be saved compare to the
similar algorithms which use all features to get ensembles. After d steps of iteration,
we get co_association matrix and then we use hierachical clustering methods on it.
And SL denotes single linkage which is used to describe the distance of clusters in
hierachical clustering algorithm.
6.3 Experimental Results
6.3.1 Measures of Performance Evaluation
Our proposed scheme is conducted by six measures which is presented in 3.3.1. In
our proposed scheme, we use the training dataset to construct the decision tree
model and then reevaluate on the test dataset and get TP, FP, TN, FN in each cluster.
After that, we calculate the four values for the test dataset. And finally, we calculate
the measures for the test dataset.
6.3.2 Results by Cascading Fuzzy C Means Clustering and C4.5
Decision Tree Classification Algorithm
Table 6.3 describes the performance evaluation comparison of C4.5, C4.5 with
feature selection and the proposed scheme on the KDD Cup 99 test dataset. The total
accuracy of these three algorithms are 0.926, 0.931, 0.935 respectively. And the
comparison shows that most precision, recall and F-measure results are improved by
using the proposed scheme. From the comparison on the table 6.3, we can see that
Table 6.3: Performance evaluation comparison
Algorithm TPR FPR Precision Recall F-Measure Class
C4.5
0.994 0.090 0.728 0.994 0.841 Normal
0.910 0.006 0.999 0.910 0.952 Anomaly
C4.5 with FS
0.990 0.084 0.741 0.990 0.847 normal
0.916 0.010 0.997 0.916 0.955 anomaly
Proposed Scheme
0.990 0.079 0.753 0.990 0.855 Normal
0.921 0.010 0.998 0.921 0.958 Anomaly
the proposed algorithm could achieve better performance, especially on the measure
of precision, accuracy and F-measure. Suppose there are m instances and n features
in training dataset. The time complexity of proposed algorithm is O(2mnt), where t
is the number of iterations.
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6.3.3 Results by New Evidence Accumulation Clustering with
Hierarchical Clustering Algorithm
We tested the proposed algorithm on KDD99 test dataset. But the instances are too
large to test. The reason is that co_association matrix is n∗n, where n is the instance
number in a dataset. Ten percent of KDD99 include about 500,000 instances. It very
diffcult to deal with the matrix by a normal computer. So we use resample function
in weka to get 1% samples in the dataset to test proposed algorithm.
We compare our proposed algorithm with the combining multiple clusterings
algorithm by Ana L.N. Fred which is proposed in 2005[47, 48]. She used whole
dataset to do n times clustering and then update the co_association matrix. And she
also used SL dendrogram to deal with co_association matrix. And the dendrogram
by this algorithm is shown in figure 6.4.
Figure 6.4: Dendrogram of Ana’s algorithm
And our proposed algorithm’s dendrogram is shown in figure 6.5.
We used K-means algorithm to do clustering and we compare the total accuracy
by K-means, Ana’s algorithm and our proposed algortihm. The results are shown in
table 6.4. All the algorithms are tested 30 times and total accuracy are the average
values. And from the results, we could see that our proposed algorithm has the same
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Figure 6.5: Dendrogram of proposed algorithm
performance as Ana’s algorithm, and better than simple K-means algorithm. In Ana’s
algorithm, it runs N times clusterings. And in every time, it uses K-means algorithm
on whole a dataset to produce a partition and then construct co-association matrix.
Unlike runing K-means N times, the number of clustering of our proposed algorithm is
depends on the number of features of datasets. The experiment is executed 10 times
and the differences between Ana’s algorithm and proposed algorithm are statistically
evaluated using paired t-test with two-tailed p = 0.01. The two algorithms achieve
statistically the same result. Suppose there are m instances and n features in training
dataset. The time complexity of proposed algorithm is O(m2n).





From table 6.4 we can see that unsupervised methods like K-means could not
achieve higher performance compared to supervised methods on KDD 99 dataset.
Although ensemble accumulation the clusters methods could help to improve the
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performance, it takes more computation time since it needs to run N times clustering
by using all features. On the contrary, our proposed algorithm generate clusters
by one feature every time. Although the result is the same as Ana’s algorithm, the
proposed algorithm greatly reduces the computational complexity. More datasets
are tested and compared with Ada’s algorithm in 7.3.
6.4 Summary
This chapter proposed two unsupervised algorithms. The first is based on the com-
bination of feature selection, fuzzy C means and C4.5 algorithms that improve the
performance results of classifiers while using a reduced set of features. It has been
applied to the KDD Cup 99 dataset in the intrusion detection field. We used a normal-
ization method on the KDD 99 training dataset and test dataset before applying the
proposed scheme to the dataset. The method improves the performance results ob-
tained by C4.5 while using only 19.5% of the total number of features. Performance
analysis is assessed against six measures. This method gives impressive detection
precision accuracy and F-measure in the experiment results. An additional advantage
is memory and time costs reduction for C4.5 classifier.
The second algorithm is a new evidence accumulation clustering algorithm. It
clusters features one by one. It promises to save computation time and is suitable





Application to Other Datasets
I N this chapter, we will test the described algorithms on other datasets. Since thealgorithms described in chapter 3 to chapter 6 are either classification algorithms or
clustering algorithms, they all could deal with datasets for classification or clustering.
We will test three proposed algorithms in this chapter and compare their performance
with other algorithms.
7.1 Test by FGMI-AHC
In chapter 3 and 4, three algorithms are proposed based on mutual information.
They are Modified Mutual Information-based Feature Selection Algorithm(MMFS),
Mutual Information-based Feature Grouping Algorithm(FGMI), Feature Grouping by
Agglomerative Hierarchical Clustering Algorithm(FGMI-AHC). From the performance
evaluation comparison of KDD 99 dataset, we can see that, FGMI-AHC could achieve
the best performance. Thus, we test FGMI-AHC algorithm on other dataset instead
of testing all the three algorithms in this chapter.
7.1.1 Dataset introduction
To verify FGMI-AHC is effective, we choose 14 datasets from UCI machine learning
repository in our experiment[8]. These datasets are often used to compare algorithms
performance in machine learning and data mining area. Table 7.1 shows outline
descriptions of the datasets, including dataset name, instance number, feature number
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and class number. Detailed information of the datasets could obtained from the UCI
website. From table 7.1, we can see that these datasets from different areas, instance
number from 187 to 11055, feature dimension from 9 to 279, and including two
class and multi-class labels. This pluralism could help to verify performance of the
algorithm in different conditions.
Table 7.1: Datasets for test in experiments
NO. Dataset name Instance NO. Feature NO. Class NO.
1 Glass 214 9 7
2 Pendigits 3498 16 10
3 Phishing Websites 11055 30 2
4 Spambase 4601 57 2
5 Ionosphere 351 34 2
6 Statlog 2000 36 6
7 Biodeg 1055 41 2
8 ThoraricSurgery 470 16 2
9 SPECT 187 22 2
10 SPECTF 187 44 2
11 Semeion 1593 265 2
12 CNAE-9 1080 256 9
13 Optdigits 1797 64 10
14 Arrhythmia 452 279 16
Since these datasets from different areas, some of them have missing values
and some of them need to change format. Thus, before testing algorithms, we
need to preprocess the datasets. We use mean value to fill missing values. And we
change discrete string to discrete digital number since this is our proposed algorithm’s
requirement.
7.1.2 Results for FGMI-AHC
To compare feature selection algorithms’ performance evaluation, we use four differ-
ent classifiers since a classifier might prefer a specific feature selection algorithm.
Table 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.4 show performance by decision tree (C4.5), 1-Nearest Neighbor
(1-NN), Support Vector Machines (SVM) and Naive Bayes classifiers respectively.
These four classifiers represent four different machine learning algorithms and they
are able to represent some feature selection algorithms. We compare our proposed
algorithm FGMI-AHC with Information Gain (IG) and ReliefF which are introduced
in chapter 2.
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In this experiment, we use weka platform to test classification algorithms and
the parameters are set to default value for each learning algorithm. Classification
accuracy is usually used as performance evaluation criteria of a subset. Table 7.2, 7.3,
7.4, 7.5 show classification accuracy comparison by different learning algorithms.
The number in parentheses next to each accuracy number are subset size obtained
from different algorithms. Some of the datasets have training dataset and test
dataset separately, some have training dataset only. In order to obtain more reliable
classification performance, these tests use 10 times 10-fold cross-validation for those
datasets who have training dataset only. In 10-fold cross-validation test, dataset is
divided into 10 parts. And 9 parts will be used as training data in turn, one part is as
the test data. Each simulation experiment will draw the appropriate classification
accuracy rate, and the average of 10 times as a result of the accuracy of an algorithm.
Table 7.2: Classification accuracy comparison by C4.5
NO. All features FGMI-AHC IG ReliefF
1 65.89%(9) 68.69%(4) 67.29%(4) 64.49%(4)
2 92.05%(16) 86.45%(6) 80.07%(6) 84.85%(6)
3 92.98%(30) 94.69%(10) 94.37%(10) 94.56%(10)
4 79.29%(57) 91.81%(9) 90.78%(9) 84.39%(9)
5 82.62%(34) 92.31%(8) 92.88%(8) 92.88%(8)
6 79.6%(36) 78.95%(9) 85.2%(9) 59.4%(9)
7 75.92%(41) 81.33%(10) 79.81%(10) 85.02%(10)
8 78.51%(16) 86.17%(7) 85.11%(7) 85.11%(7)
9 60.96%(22) 72.73%(9) 70.05%(9) 70.05%(9)
10 69.52%(44) 73.26%(11) 72.73%(11) 69.52%(11)
11 92.09%(265) 94.85%(19) 94.1%(19) 94.48%(19)
12 93.15%(256) 75.74%(18) 75.46%(18) 69.91%(18)
13 89.43%(64) 86.7%(20) 83.81%(20) 86.09%(20)
14 61.73%(279) 70.35%(16) 68.81%(16) 67.27%(16)
The highest value which is in bold represents the best performance of the three
algorithms in each dataset. The value in parentheses are the number of selected
features in each dataset. We selected the same number of features to compare
by different feature selection algorithms. From table 7.2 to 7.4, we can see that
FGMI-AHC has the best performance in most datasets. The performance by using
all features in each dataset are shown in each table as well. Figure 7.1 shows
classification accuracy comparison by different learning algorithms clearly.
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Table 7.3: Classification accuracy comparison by 1-NN
NO. All features FGMI-AHC IG ReliefF
1 70.56%(9) 71.5%(4) 70.56%(4) 69.63%(4)
2 97.74%(16) 94.83%(9) 90.91%(9) 94.83%(9)
3 96.84%(30) 94.8%(10) 92.83%(10) 93.3%(10)
4 90.78%(57) 86.7%(9) 88.76%(9) 79.68%(9)
5 86.32%(34) 89.46%(8) 90.31%(8) 92.02%(8)
6 89%(36) 86.95%(9) 86.1%(9) 59.15%(9)
7 84.46%(41) 83.62%10) 79.24%10) 82.75%10)
8 77.23%(16) 77.87%(7) 77.45%(7) 74.68%(7)
9 66.31%(22) 62.57%(9) 62.03%(9) 60.43%(9)
10 61.5%(44) 69.52%(11) 62.57%(11) 67.38%(11)
11 97.61%(265) 92.72%(19) 92.59%(19) 92.47%(19)
12 85%(256) 70.56%(18) 68.89%(18) 64.44%(18)
13 97.94%(64) 96.27%(20) 94.38%(20) 96.1%(20)
14 52.88%(279) 59.96%(16) 58.41%(16) 56.64%(16)
Table 7.4: Classification accuracy comparison by SVM
NO. All features FGMI-AHC IG ReliefF
1 57.48%(9) 60.75%(4) 57.94%(4) 58.88%(4)
2 94.94%(16) 85.71%(6) 70.78%(6) 79.67%(6)
3 93.8%(30) 93.88%(10) 93.26%(10) 92.67%(10)
4 90.41%(57) 85.66%(9) 83.98%(9) 77.92%(9)
5 88.6%(34) 85.19%(8) 84.05%(8) 84.9%(8)
6 85.1%(36) 83.4%(9) 83.5%(9) 57.75%(9)
7 85.59%(41) 79.62%(10) 76.87%(10) 83.22%(10)
8 84.89%(16) 85.11%(7) 84.89%(7) 84.89%(7)
9 67.91%(22) 69.52%(9) 65.78%(9) 69.52%(9)
10 72.19%(44) 70.59%(11) 68.45%(11) 70.59%(11)
11 98.31%(265) 95.1%(19) 94.92%(19) 94.73%(19)
12 94.17%(256) 75.09%(18) 74.81%(18) 70.19%(18)
13 96.49%(64) 93.32%(20) 92.1%(20) 92.71%(20)
14 70.13%(279) 68.58%(16) 63.27%(16) 67.48%(16)
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Table 7.5: Classification accuracy comparison by Naive Bayes
NO. All features FGMI-AHC IG ReliefF
1 57.48%(9) 60.75%(4) 57.94%(4) 58.88%(4)
2 82.13%(16) 72.93%(6) 60.52%(6) 78.56%(6)
3 92.98%(30) 92.92%(10) 92.81%(10) 92.56%(10)
4 79.29%(57) 82.81%(9) 77.9%(9) 66.36%(9)
5 82.62%(34) 88.31%(8) 89.74%(8) 90.88%(8)
6 79.6%(36) 78.95%(9) 79.65%(9) 58.45%(9)
7 75.92%(41) 73.74%(10) 72.8%(10) 68.15%(10)
8 78.51%(16) 84.68%(7) 83.83%(7) 82.77%(7)
9 60.96%(22) 70.05%(9) 65.78%(9) 69.52%(9)
10 69.52%(44) 69.52%(11) 67.91%(11) 68.45%(11)
11 92.09%(265) 89.52%(19) 89.39%(19) 88.39%(19)
12 93.15%(256) 76.39%(18) 76.02%(18) 70.09%(18)
13 89.43%(64) 87.25%(20) 86.59%(20) 87.15%(20)
14 52.88%(279) 66.81%(16) 66.37%(16) 65.71%(16)
Since FGMI-AHC algorithm is based on agglomerative hierarchical clustering, a
different distance metric could produce different results. In our experiments, we use
inner squared distance.
7.2 Test by OSFS
In chapter 5, we proposed two Online Streaming Feature Selection Algorithms
(OSFS). OSFS1 is based on two thresholds which need to be input before using the
algorithm and OSFS2 based on criteria which is calculated in the algorithm. OSFS1
requires users learn more about a dataset before using it. So we use OSFS2 to test
on other datasets to compare with other algorithms.
In this test, we use same datasets as section 7.1. And we compare the performance
with mRMR algorithm which is used in chapter 5. Figure 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 show
the classification accuracy comparison between OSFS2 and mRMR by decision tree
(C4.5), 1-Nearest Neighbor (1-NN), Support Vector Machines (SVM) and Naive Bayes
classifiers respectively.
From the comparison we could see that OSFS2 could achieve better performance
that mRMR algorithm. Table 7.6 describes comparison results between OSFS2 and
mRMR. The last row of the table shows the number of selected features for each
dataset.
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Figure 7.1: Classification accuracy comparison by different algorithms100
7.2. Test by OSFS
Figure 7.2: Classification accuracy between OSFS2 and mRMR by C4.5
Figure 7.3: Classification accuracy between OSFS2 and mRMR by 1-NN
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Figure 7.4: Classification accuracy between OSFS2 and mRMR by SVM
Figure 7.5: Classification accuracy between OSFS2 and mRMR by Naive Bayes
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7. APPLICATION TO OTHER DATASETS
7.3 Test by NEAC
In chapter 6, two algorithms which used unsupervised methods are proposed. New
Evidence Accumulation Clustering algorithm is the more successful of the two algo-
rithms, and so in this chapter we test New Evidence Accumulation Clustering with
Hierarchical Clustering Algorithm (NEAC) on other datasets.
In this experiment, we test 8 datasets which are from section 7.1. They are
showed in table 7.7. All of the datasets in table 7.7 have 2 class. The reason is that
NEAC has a limitation that it could only solve 2-class problem.
Table 7.7: Datasets for test in experiments
NO. Dataset name Instance NO. Feature NO.
1 Phishing Websites 11055 30
2 Spambase 4601 57
3 Ionosphere 351 34
4 Biodeg 1055 41
5 ThoraricSurgery 470 16
6 SPECT 187 22
7 SPECTF 187 44
8 Semeion 1593 265
We compare proposed NEAC algorithm with Ada’s algorithm which is used in
Chapter 6 to compare performance evaluation. Figure 7.6 shows accuracy comparison
between NEAC and Ada’s algorithm. From the comparison, we can see that accuracy
is very close between the two algorithms in each dataset. The detailed accuracy
values are illustrated in table 7.8.
Table 7.8: Accuracy comparison between NEAC and Ada’s algorithm
NO. Dataset name Ada’s algorithm NEAC
1 Phishing Websites 55.71% 55.89%
2 Spambase 60.57% 60.57%
3 Ionosphere 63.82% 64.39%
4 Biodeg 66.16% 66.16%
5 ThoraricSurgery 85.11% 84.89%
6 SPECT 54.55% 55.61%
7 SPECTF 92.51% 92.51%
8 Semeion 90.02% 90.4%
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Figure 7.6: Accuracy comparison between NEAC and Ada’s algorithm
In this test, we use single link method over the similarity matrix for producing
dendrogram in both of the two algorithms. And we set the number of clusters
in K-means algorithm to 60. And in Ada’s algorithm, we run 60 times to get the
co-association matrix in every dataset since the feature number of most datasets in
table 7.7 are less than 60. From the accuracy comparison in table 7.7, we can see
that the values are very close among the eight group data. Three of them are equal,
NEAC won four of them and lost one.
To investigate the impact of the parameters and settings in NEAC. The distance
between clusters in hierachical clustering we used is single in above tests. We use
another two different distance complete and average to compare. Single, complete
and average are shortest, furthest and unweighted average distance between clusters
respectively. And accuracy comparison by NEAC on different parameters are shown
in figure 7.9. The last column shows different k values in NEAC algorithm, we change
k = 2 to k = 60 and the results are shown in figure 7.9. And from the results we
can see that k value has litte impact on the result. And different distance between
clusters in hierachical clustering impacted the results very much.
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Table 7.9: Accuracy comparison by NEAC on different parameters
NO. Dataset name NEAC
Single Complete Average k=60
1 Phishing Websites 55.89% 54.08% 52.71% 55.89%
2 Spambase 60.57% 83.46% 75.64% 60.57%
3 Ionosphere 64.39% 63.82% 62.96% 64.39%
4 Biodeg 66.16% 75.83% 63.41% 66.16%
5 ThoraricSurgery 84.89% 57.02% 50.21% 84.47%
6 SPECT 55.61% 58.82% 58.82% 54.55%
7 SPECTF 92.51% 95.19% 92.51% 92.51%




I N this chapter, a high level summary of the research as detailed in the precedingchapters will be presented. The thesis has demonstrated some feature selection
algorithms on KDD 99 dataset after reviewed relevant approaches in the literature.
After that, we compared the results with either the original approaches or relevant
techniques in the literature. The most promising of the proposed algorithms has
also been tested on other datasets. This chapter also presents a number of initial
thoughts about the directions for future research.
8.1 Summary of Thesis
Detailed descriptions and statistical observations of KDD 99 dataset are introduced
in chapter 1. Since the dataset is widely used dataset for intrusion detection, it is
used to test proposed feature selection algorithms. Datasets of intrusion detection
area usually have large instances and features. Take KDD 99 dataset for example, it
has 5 millions instances in training dataset and we could only use 10 % of it to test
our proposed algorithms.
A survey of feature selection and intrusion detection system has been given in
chapter 2. A brief history and classification of IDS are presented. After that, it states
some approaches and challenges to intrusion detection. Feature selection part is very
important in this thesis. In chapter 2, feature selection process and four evaluation
measures are described. And four feature selection approaches are also presented,
they are used to compare with my proposed algorithms in other chapters.
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Modified mutual information-based feature selection algorithms has been pro-
posed in chapter 3. Mutual information is specifically introduced in the chapter since
this algorithm is based on mutual information (MI) theory. The mutual information
between each feature and class label shown the relationship between features and
class label. MMFS algorithm considered MI not only between each feature and class
label, but also between two features. At last, MMFS was compared with DMIFS
which is proposed by Huawen in 2009. Computation comparison are given as well
in this chapter.
Chapter 4 presented two feature grouping algorithms based on mutual informa-
tion. FGMI uses fuzzy C means clustering algorithm to get groups. And FGMI-AHC
algorithm creates groups using agglomerative hierarchical clustering method. The
two algorithms are compared with DMIFS and MMFS by different number of selected
features. And they are also compared by different classification algorithms. And
from the comparison, we can see that FGMI-AHC could achieve better performance
than FGMI.
Chapter 5 states two online streaming feature selection algorithms, OSFS1 and
OSFS2. They are based on the analysis of feature relevance and redundancy. OSFS1
uses threshold to decide whether a feature is redundant or relevant with labels and
other features. And OSFS1 limits its application as users need to understand the
candidate dataset before using it. OSFS2 utilizes a criterion which is computed by
relevance and redundancy values. And it has more universal applicability.
Two algorithms in chapter 6 use unsupervised method on kdd 99 dataset. Cas-
cading Fuzzy C Means Clustering and C4.5 Decision Tree Classification Algorithm
combines fuzzy C means and C4.5 together. And it divides data into two parts
according to menbership which is got from clustering result by fuzzy C means. Then,
it classifies data in each part separately. NEAC algorithm is based on evidence accu-
mulation clustering, and it clusters each column of a dataset, rather than a whole
dataset.
In chapter 7, we test our proposed algorithms on other datasets. We got 14
datasets from UCI machine learning repository. And we test three algorithms, FGMI-
AHC, OSFS2 and NEAC. From the comparison results, we could see that our proposed
algorithms are effective and could get better performance.
For all the algorithms we proposed, OSFS2 could achieve the best performance
on KDD 99 dataset. And cascading Fuzzy C Means Clustering and C4.5 Decision
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Tree Classification Algorithm get the worst performance. And the results of MMIFS,
FGMI, FGMI-AHC, OSFS and Cascading Fuzzy C Means Clustering and C4.5 Decision
Tree Classification Algorithm come to the expected target, but NEAC does not. The
reason is that consensus function we used in NEAC is k-means clustering method
and result in the performance are not significant compare to Ada’s algorithm.
I think future directions in this area should include the following aspects. Firstly,
feature selection is a kind of dimensionality reduction. And dimensionality reduction
is not only for features but also for instance. Like feature selection, instance should
be selected and it might be used in IDS area. Moreover, traditional feature selection
algorithms are not applicable for big data and variable dimension datasets whose
feature and instance numbers are not fixed. OSFS is a method could solve this
problem and more similar methods are needed. At last, the relationships of features is
very important in this area, it determines feature selection strategies. Thus, designing
more effective measurements to measure the relationship between features is vital
direction as well.
8.2 Future Works
From chapter 3 to 6, we proposed some feature selection algorithms and unsupervised
methods for intrusion detection area. In chapter 7, we could see that these algorithm
could be applied on other datasets and other areas. Some of them need to be
improved and some of them need to be expanded and applied in other areas. In this
section, future works are discussed.
8.2.1 Short Term Tasks
The algorithms proposed in the thesis are good enough and some of them need to
improved or expanded. This section will propose some potential work for some
algorithms.
8.2.1.1 MMFS
Most proposed algorithms use mutual information to measure the relationship be-
tween features in this thesis. MMFS algorithm is the most typical one. We could find
other metrics or methods to measure instead of mutual information and compare the
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results with different measurements. And methods which could measure relation-
ship between features could be used, such as correlation. Some of measurements
could be used to produce a similarity matrix and create groups for feature grouping
algorithms.
8.2.1.2 FGMI
The selecting strategy of feature grouping used in this algorithm is selecting one
feature from each group. As it is discussed in chapter 4, we could design different
selecting strategies for feature grouping. Figure 8.1 shows outline of improved
selecting strategy of feature grouping. In improved scheme, we can select different
number of features from one group based on some selecting strategies. For example,
we could select 2 or more features from a group and the number of selected features
could be different from a group to other groups. And selecting should be help for
classification rather than random selecting. As stated above, different measurements
also could be used to create groups and it could combine with selecting strategies.
8.2.1.3 OSFS
The criterion of online streaming feature selection algorithm could be considered
to revise by more reasonable methods. Current criterion of OSFS2 is based on
relevance and mutual information between features. If we use other methods to
change the criterion, the results of OSFS2 will be changed. The criterion we used
now is related to the measurement between features. And criteria should reflect
whether a streaming feature could help the selected feature for classification. Thus,
the relationship between a streaming feature and other features and class labels are
very important to construct the criterion. As we discussed in chapter 5, the results of
OSFS will vary depending on the order in which features are streamed. Therefore,
the criterion should to reduce the influence of it.
8.2.2 Long Term Developments
In this section, some ideas about IDS and related algorithm improvements are
discussed. And this work could be seen as long term developments.
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Figure 8.1: Improved selecting strategy of feature grouping
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8.2.2.1 Unsupervised methods for IDS
In chapter 6, we proposed two algorithms related to unsupervised learning method
to deal with IDS. Cascading Fuzzy C Means Clustering and C4.5 Decision Tree
Classification algorithm could only used for two class labeled dataset and it needs to
be improved in the future. One advantage of NEAC algorithm is it clustering features
one by one. But how to store the matrix when data growing is a problem to be solved
in future.
8.2.2.2 Application to Big Data
Both OSFS and NEAC algorithms deal with dataset by features. OSFS streaming a
feature every time and NEAC cluster one feature at a time. This characteristic could
be used on big data area which is a hot area recently. But it still needs to solve many
problems, such as data storage, intermediate results storage and processing and so
on.
8.2.2.3 Real-time IDS
All the proposed algorithms and methods in this thesis could only be used for static
dataset of IDS. None of them could applied on real-time intrusion detection system.
Real-time IDS requres response in time and it usually deals with data according to
instance. Machine learning methods could be used on real-time IDS, but it needs
more improvements and testing in practical.
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Publications Arising from the Thesis
A number of publications have been generated from the research carried out within
the PhD project. Below lists the resultant publications that are in close relevance to
the thesis.
1. Jingping Song, Zhiliang Zhu, Peter Scully and Chris Price, "Selecting Features
for Anomaly Intrusion Detection A Novel Method using Fuzzy C Means and
Decision Tree Classification", Cyberspace Safety and Security. Springer Interna-
tional Publishing, 2013: 299-307.
2. Jingping Song, Zhiliang Zhu, Peter Scully and Chris Price, "Modified Mutual
Information-based Feature Selection for Intrusion Detection Systems in Decision
Tree Learning", Journal of computers, 2014, 9(7): 1542-1546.
3. Jingping Song, Zhiliang Zhu and Chris Price, Feature Grouping for Intrusion
Detection System Based on Hierarchical Clustering, Availability, Reliability,
and Security in Information Systems, Springer International Publishing, 2014:
270-280.
4. Jingping Song, Zhiliang Zhu and Chris Price, "Feature Grouping for Intrusion
Detection Based on Mutual Information," Journal of Communications, vol. 9,
no. 12, pp. 987-993, 2014.
5. Scully P, Song J, Disso J P, et al. "CARDINAL-E: AIS Extensions to CARDINAL for
Decentralised Self-Organisation for Network Security", Advances in Artificial






CFS Correlation based Feature Selection
DMIFS Feature Selection using Dynamic Mutual Information
DR Detection Rate
FCM Fuzzy C Means
FGMI Feature Grouping for Intrusion Detection based on Mutual Information




FPR False Positive Rate
FS Feature Selection
HIDS Host based Intrusion Detection System




MMFS Modified Mutual Information-based Feature Selection
mRMR Maximum Relevance Minimum Redundancy
NEAC New Evidence Accumulation Clustering Algorithm
NIDS Network based Intrusion Detection System
P Precision
R Recall
OSFS Online Streaming Feature Selection
OSFS1 Online Streaming Feature Selection Algorithm 1
OSFS2 Online Streaming Feature Selection Algorithm 2
SBE Sequential Backward Elimination
SFS Sequential Forward Selection




TPR True Positive Rate
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